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CARNEGSE ENDOWMENT FOR I N I E R N I T I O H A L PEACE

THE DIPLOMACY OF DISARMAMENT
'I'he imperatives of survival in an atomic age have lent
d q e r a t e urgency to the search for security. But by their
very nature they have hugely emptied that search of content
and meaning. Fear has driven men to negotiate and fear has
averted agreement. There can, it is said, be no trust without
disarmament and no disarmament without trust.
Meanwhile, the p w e r of annihilation grows to a point
where mere accident could unleash devastation, and nations
lesg practiced in the arts of self-restraint may come to hold
that power in the not ltoo distant future.
The unavailing struggle of the past decade and a half to
establish "a system for the r-lation of armaments," as provided for in the United Nations Charter, has been the
subject af searching inquiry and heated controvmy. Each
observer makes his own interpretation of the factrr and clings
tenaciottsly to his own prognosis. The author of the present
article also has a point of view, and it is one with which
there will doubtless be some disagreement. Nevertheless, it
it hoped that this schematic effort to analyze rhc disarrnament negotiations since 1445 will help to sharpen the issues
and will provide insights into the Sisyphean tmk of preventing man from destroying himself.
JOSEPH NOGEE, Assistant Rofes9or of Political Science,
University of Houston,has devoted himself for several years
to the question of d i i m e n t . It was the subject of hb
doctoral dissertation at Yale University and of several articles,
including the disarmament sections of the 1988 and 1959
"ISUEY Before the United Nations G e n m l Asarmbly" of
International Conciliation.
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THEFIRST SUC~CESSFULexplosion of an atomic bomb, on 16
July 1945 in New Mexico, inaugurated a new era in the history of arms development. It also marked a new era in the
problem of armament control. Only twenty days previously.
the delegates of Mty nations had signed the Charter of a new
world organization whose principal politiml organ was made
responsible, inter alias"for foxmulathag .. . plans . . . for the
establishment of a system for the regulation aE armaments."'
OC course, the atomic bomb was at that t h e a closely guapded military secret. Whether public awareness of the existence
of this new weapon would have resulted in a more p i t i v e
commitment to disarmament is only a matter of speculation.
Almost fifteen years have passed. Instead of moving toward
disarmament or even controlled regulation of arm, the major powers have tteen involved in tbe greatest arms race
known to man. The fictora that have bustrated the expectatiom of 1945 are by nuw well known. They are, prlncipdly,
a miou deterioration in relations among the major powers,
whose ccmmsus is necessary to create an arms agreement,
and tht development of an arms technology, the control of
which would involve considerable infringement of national
sovereignty. And yet, almost su+EagTy
in view of this situation, the past decade and a half has witnessed almost ccajp
less negotiations about arms agreements, and both the United
States and the Soviet Union are agreed that "the quation of
general disarmament is the most important one facing the
world t ~ d a y ~ ' ~
1Charter of the Udwd Hktim, krt 26.
~ ~ m u n i q uissued
b
b Rcddmt Eknhower ead Premier ~ c h e v ,
0 Sept. 1959. k p r o d d in U.S. Deponmcnt of State Bulbin, Vol. XW,
NO. la59 (12oa. 1959. p. m.

In order to undexstand more fully the disarmament prablern as of 1960 a brief review is necessary. This study will
focus upon three aspects of the problem: first, the changing
aspects of the disarmament neptiations since 1945; sewnd,
the principal obstacles to a Soviet-Westernpower agreement;
and third, some of the p I i t i a l uses ta which disarmament
negotiations have been put.
Two of the principal diEculties in predicting success or
failure in disarmament negotiations are the changing plitical aIi,o;nments in interaatianal politics and the new developments in weapons tecbolagy. Both relate to the questions
of who is to be disarmed and what instruments of war are to
IN denied to nations.
In the months immediately following the end of 'CVurlcl
War 11, disarmament was thought of principally in connection with the defeated powers and, indeed, was actually

enforced far a time vhh-vis Germany and Japan. Article 26
of the United Nations Charter, however. anticipated the
c~eatiionof an intamationat system regulating armaments.
Clearly such a system wouId have to be multiIarera1. By vesting primary responsibility for disarmament in the Securit~
Council, the Charter provided, furthermore, for a multilarcral formulation of this spm.
Little more than a year after defeat of the Axis, the Paris
Peace C o M highlighted the beginning of im entirely
new political alignment. By d y 1947 the division between
the Axis powers and the AlBd coalition had been replaced
by that between the Weatem d~~~
and the Soviet
Union. This disruption ofAllied unity was to have profound
consequences for the multilateral disarmament arrangements
implied in the Chapter* One of the fundamental assumptions
behind all the pmvisicrns relaring to the Security Council
had been that the Big Five (China, France, the USSR, the
United Kingdom, and the United States) would have to work
together toward a world-wide spwm. But what the Soviet
Union and Western powers have k e n seeking, witb few exceptions in the past fourteen years, is disarmament of each
other-a
far different matter.

Initially forced to negotiate within the hmeurork of the
h r i t y Council and related bodies, the major powers soon
found themselves in a s m i t jacket. The formal rules d a
United Nations organ, the maintenance of a public official
record, and the inclusion of "extraneous" nations in the
negotiating group have, from the point of view of both sides,
k e n obstacles to attaining a disarmament agreement. As a
result, rnultilateraI negotiations for an agreement to apply
to many nations have gradually been displaced in favor of
nepfiations between East and West aimed at disarming only
a few nations, at least initially. Taking into consideration
the intensity of debate and the accomplishments of ne-gotiating Wie, one can note that the trend has been for the
more h i t l u l groups to be smaller and to center around the
Big Four-France, the USSR, the United Kingdom, and h e
United S t a t e ~ f t e noutside the United Nationa
As regards the scope of these negotiations, changes in
weapons technology have exercised a determining influence.
Disarmament has mditionally referred to the abolition of
armies, navies, and fortifications or to a reduction in the
number of men under arms, tanks, guns, ships, aircraft, and
other equipment. T h e birth of atomic weapons immediately
involved the United Nations in negotiating toward a much
wider goal: international control over the complete production of a potentially major industry. But that effect was only
t e m p m y . As existing stocks grew and the destructive power
of nuclear weapons increased (to theoretically unlimited
pmprtions), the difficulty of negotiating an agreement also
increased. The development of intermediate-range ball istic
missiles (IRBMs) and intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs)during the latter part oE the 1950s compounded the
difficulty of reaching agreement on reduction or regulation
of armaments and of devising a "Eoolproaf' control system.
Consequently, disarmament effortshave been concernd
with more limited goals. In lieu of an agreement on comprehensive arxlrs reduction or reguIation, the major powers
have sought agreement on partial disarmament rneasurcs
requiring less drastic control systems. Since the 1955 summit

meeting in Geneva, digcussions have been more and more
concerned with questions relating to prevention of 5urprk
attack and to "'confidence-building" first step. Even earrower in m p e has been the one question on which there is
currently more than a alight hope of agreement-cessation
of nuclear testing.

The Changing Framework of Negotiations
THEBREAXDOWN of attempts to negotiate a general post-war
disarmament agreement was the direct result sfthe mld war.
Agreement on regulating arms had k e n envisaged as a complement to the establishment of an international d t y
system. fn describing the anticipated operation of the Security Council, Secretary of State Cordell HuII had swessed that
it was based upon the assumption that "each a£ [the major
powers] will maintain adequate form and will be willing
to use such forces as circumstances require to prevent w
suppress all cases of aggres~ion."~Under Article 45 of the
Charter all Members of the Organization were to u n d d e
to make available to the Security Council, in accordance with
agreements to be conduded, the armed forces neceS5ary to
maintain international peace. Plans for the application of:
armed force were to be made by the Security Council with
the assistance of the Military Staff Committee (Article 46).
This was the same committee that, under Article 26, was to
mist the Security Council in formufating plans for arms
regulation. Relying upon the mistance of the same group
to create both an international a r m y and a system of a r m s
regulation may s e a unusual, but it was a natural wnse
quence of what the major powers nrnsirltered to be a necessary interconnection.
The Military Staff Committee never was able to fulfdl
its mandate under Article 26. It immediately became deadlocked on the problem of creating an armed force for use by
the Security Council. O n 50 April 1947 the Committee rea Memorandum for rhe M h t , 29 IEce. 1943. Quoted in Inis L. Claude.
Jr, Strnadt Inlo Plwshrrr(!s, 2nd rd. mew York, Random H o w 19!59),
p"85.
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ported to the Security Chuncil its recornmeadations for the
organization of a collective force. Of the fortyane artieEes
in its report not more than twenty-five had secured unanimous agreement; and the sixteen articles on which there waa
no harmony canrained the mwt impartant elements of an
international force? With the hilure of the Military Staff
Committee, any immediate paspects far a system of a r m
regulation within a United Nations security framework died.
The first seriou p t - w a r disarmament negotiations took
place within the United Nations Atomic Energy Chmmission, which had been created on 24 January 1946 under the
fint resolution of the first General Asslemblv. Its membership was the same as that of the Security &ncil (with the
addition of Canada whenever that country was not a member
of the C ~ u n c i l )For
. ~ twenty-one months it served as the prim
cipal arena for disarmament negotiations, since a&that time
the ~n'itedStates held that some sort of control over atomic
energy would be necessary before success in the general area
of xhe regtilation of armaments would be p i b l e . On 17
May 1948 the Commission adopted its third and final r e p t ,
the lint sentence of which noted succinctly: "The Atomic
Energy Commission repats that it has read& an
Previously, on IS February 1947, the Security Council had
established ;he cammission for ~onventionaiArmaments,
with the same members hi^ as the Comcil. This Commission
was unable to r m r d anyamoresuccess than its atomic counterpart, and Erm mid-1948 until &he spring of 1954 there
rvere for a11 practical purposes no serious negotiations.
4 k Rcpwt of the Milftary Staft Eolrnmittn, in United Natbns &?mrity
Cwadl. Om&l Records (5CQR): 2nd Year, 1947, Spec. Suppl. No. 1.
S C h ~ d awas included bccauc, along w i t h the United States and Unitcd
Kingdom. i t p a s a d the knowledge essential tc tbe usc of atomic energy.
Canadian dentists had rcidpnted in the wartime r
d and dewtop.
rnrnt of the atomic bomkmd Canadian u M l w was im irnpmrnr mars
fix the ftrel that went inm tbe bomb.
R q r t to the Security Coundl. 17 Map 1918, in United N a b
Atomic Energy CkmamMon~0Rcmndr (UNAEC, OR): 3rd Year1 Sper
suppl, p. 1.
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On 29 July 1949 h e Atomic Energy C o m i ~ i o n
acknowledged that for it to hold further discusaians would serve "no
practicable or usefial purpose" and called upon the Sponsoring Powers (the Big Fiw and Canada) to get together
privately? Although six-power discussions in late 1949 and
debate in the General Assembly offered no p u n c h to expect
more success from private than from public discussions, tbe
fourth General Assembly called upan the six to continue
their consultations. The year 1950, however, proved to be
one of silence. After the USSR walked out of the Security
Council and the two disarmament Commissions in January,
and the Korean war began, disarmament talb broke down
completely.
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In an e8Em to restructure the negotjatiom, tbe Geaesal
Aescmbly on 11 January 1952 created a single Dismmmcnt
Commission to replace and encoapass the work of the
Canrnirrioru on both atomic energy and mnvenrional armaments? But any expectation that an amalgamred commb
&ionwouId facilitate agreement an an over-all disaneament
plan w a disproved by the first two yearsnwork of the Commission. An interim f h t report of the Commission on 28
May 1952 merely noted that "hediscussions . are continuing." A second repert appmved in October 1952 summarized the futile dellates? The seventh General Assembly that
year prodded the Corrrmissian to further &omIbut to no
avail. Bemeen the seventh and eighth sessions of the Assembly the COmmkion held only one meeting.

..

7 k UNAEG 01: 4th Year. No, 8.24th Mtg, 29 July 1940, p. 5 4 far thc
United States draft mlutim,
&In bclared reempition of t a connc~don
votn
ktwccn
2. a W c and wnvm(Sonal mmamena, President Trumm had m k d Llnircd States policy two
that hAm& Enngp Gmmiaaion and thc
m
m P ~ W b&~ suggcsrlq
Y
Commixdon lor
oeatinnd Armamm o m a t e their work in ~ n
ammimion.
*See United Nations Disarm8ment ~ m r n i s h Oflciel
,
Rccotdsr 1% Ret, ?bp&merit Ew A dl, May, and June 195% D4C. DCJLI. plm 12, a d
acpms Spr. ~ u Me.~ 1. magex*.
~ f
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By 1953 the USSR .had subtantially r e d u d the gap in
atomic power between it and the United Stam and had
dcvelopd a sizable atackpile of atomic weapons.' In August
of that year it exp1oded a hydrogen device--only some nine
months after the Gsst such explosion by the United States.
Differentiation between the great and lesser powers had dready bem carried a step further by the United Kingdom's
demonsnation in October of the previous year that it p
jcssed an atomic weapon. Aware of the increased importance
of agreement between the leaders of the two sides before
any disarmament could be achieved, the eighth General
Assembly asked the Disarmament Commission to "study the
desirability of establishing a sub-committee consisting of
representatives of the Powers principally involved, which
should aeek 'in private an acceptable sulution."l0 This a p
p m c h was supported by the Big Four foreign ministers at
their conference in BerIin in the spring of 1954.

With the establishment of the D b m t Com&ionrs
fivepowerS u b C o m m i t t d n a d a , France, the USSR, the
United Kingdom, and the United Stilt19 April 1954,
negotiations entered a new phase. For the next bur years,
meetings were conducted in private. The SubCommitset
held five major series of discussions: I 3 May-22 June 1954;
25 FebrrtqI8 May 1955; 29 August-7 October 1955; 19
March4 May 1956; and 18 March4 September 1957. During
this period every phase of dkamament w considered at one
time or another. At various times the p u p was reported
nearing an agreement but, whEIe positions changed on both
sides and a healthy "darification of views" took place, the
net rtsult remained a stalemate. The fifth and last report of
the Sub-Committee was submitted on 6 Septeniber 1957 "as
1aCeneral AsfembIy W. 715 (VnI), 28 Nov. 1955..Although the W e t
rcprescnladvc ahpinad, this waa thr first time since 1946 that the USSR
had not voted againat an Assembly rcwlutian on diurmutleat.

a M e r progreS1P report."'l Since then,however, neither the
SubCollunittee nor, except for one purely f m d meeting,

its parat M y has met. These S u b C o d t t e e m h g
in fact, the h t negotiations held under tbc direct
auspices of the United Nations.

were,

Since 1957 there has been further bipolarization of SovietWestern efforts. Two h c t m conaibuted to this. One was
Soviet dissatkhctionwith the numerid dominance of Western powers at negotiating sesiom-hence the Soviet demand
for *'prity"
between the two sides. The other was United
States unwillingness to increase the number of negotiators
on the ground that too many nations makc a graup unwieldy
and result only in propagandistic speeches. An attempt to
compromise these views at the twelfth General Assembly
satisfied no one. The membership of the Dismament Commission was enlarged from twelve, of which tcn wcrt bound
to the United States by military treaties, to twenty-five, of
which sixteen were United States allies. This change was
considered inadequate by the USSR, which boycotted the
Cornmiasion and thus made any meeting pointleas. In 1958
the General Assembly acceded to Soviet demands and enlarged the Disarmament Commission to include all Members
of the United Nations, but no more use has 'been made of it
than of the twenty-fivemember group
Nevertheless, the past two years have seen an intensification of disarmament diplomacy among the great powers* in
the context of direct East-West conhntations. In the spring
of 1958 President Eisenhower and Premier Khmhchev engaged in an exchange of correspondence that resutmi In
agreemenu ro hold two conferences of experts on two differa t aspects of disarmament: surprise attack and cessation of
nuclear weapons tests. In compliance with Premier Khrush-

.

t w rcpm are cantPintd in, rcsptctivcl United Nationr l?m.
OClU, PP June 19Y1; DC/?I, 1 ht. 1955; D C / ~ . I May 1951; DC/IlP,
1 Aug. 1957; ond DC/llS, 11 EL
1957.

chev's histence on the principle of "equal representation
of muntries which are members of the Attantic Pact and
the Warsaw Treaty" the membership of the surprise attack
conference was limited to five nations from each of the respective g r ~ u p It. ~met in Geneva in late 1958 but after

. ..

thirty sessions d hitless sp-g
abandoned its &or&
Considerably more s u c c d l was the "C8xrferenceof Experts to Study the Possibility of Detecting Violations of a
Possible &cement on Suspension of Nuclear Tests."It met
from 1 July through 21 A u p t 1958. Participating in the
conference were experts fkom four Westeh countries (Canada, France, United Kingdom, United States) and four Eastern (eeechoslovdia, Polad, Romania, USSR). It was a
strictly scientific and technical assemblage. It h3d no man&te to nqptiate an actual cessation but was m@ly to report
on the feasibility and quiremknh of a control syatem. Perhap beotusu its tasfr was so limited, this technical conference
was an unqualified s u m rare phenomenon in p t World War I1 hiotoy.
Spumed on by this achievement, the three nudear powers
agreed in late summer 1958 to hold a second conference on
cessation of nuclear tests, this one given the more political
task of developing a detailed agreement between the USSR,
the United Kingdom, and the United States to end nudear
weapons tests and to create a control system to s u m the
ban. This conference has been meeting intermittently since
31 October 1958.
Second only to the Berlin q%estion,d'warmanent was
among the principal subjects of dknssion among the foreign
ministers and at the Eisenhower-Khrushchev talks in 1959.
One result has been the formation of a new ten-member &
- lagovie; note of 15 Scpt. 1958.
d u d in ~ . ~ . ' ~ c ~ a rofh State
m t
Bulle1im, Vol XXXIX* No. I M 9
C h 1958). p. 649. The tm a a . t h
were the same as thaac making u the new diaarmarncnt mmmittae formcd
br 1959 acepr that Bnlgaril rt?Albania in the 111m M
y.AL the
rurprk attack mnfenna and L c conk-oc
ol ex ta on n u b mu
the W a r had a tingle delegation &at included n a ~ i o m r athe
~ vzdws muntries. The East, in contrast, sent q x m m national delegntiom. Thh d i cnce ma hare importance wilh regad to htunc r k u a m m DR pnrity ~f
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armament committee, again outside the framework of the
United Nations; it was scheduled to begin consideration of
the over-all problem of disarmament early in 1950. Comprising the new group are Canada, France, Italy, the United
Kingdom, the United States, and Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,
PoIand, Romania, and the USSR. With the inclusion of the
Eastern European states, the Soviet Union ha9 at last
achieved the parity in a general arms negotiating group it
has sought for years. In eEect, it is the East and W e t as
blocs &at are now bargaining.
It should be noted, however, that any decisions reached
will be reported to the United Nations through its eightytwo member Disarmament Commission. The fourteenth
General Assembly has accepted this arrangement, for, idthough today bipolarization of disarmament negotiations
has been carried further than ever before, disarmament remains one of the principal concerns of the United Nations.
The ten-nation committeensreports to the Disarmament
Commission will be debated by the General Amembly. In
addition, the Secretariat will service the committee and the
Serretafy-Gmeral will be represented at its meetings, Beyand
this, it is not yet certain what role the United Nations will
play as the new group goes into action.

The Changing Scope of Negotiations
NOTHING
HIGHLIGHTS the problem of disarmament in the
cold war more than the changing scope and subject matter
aE the negotiations. Largely, of course, lhese changes mirror
changes in technological development. But the influence of
changing technology is subtle and pervasive, and not confined to merely dcterrnining what new weapons--be they
space satellites or rnissiles--could be outlawed. Changing
weapons systems bring changes in military strategy and tactics, and these "secondary changes" have a further impact
on the goals of disarmament efforts.
T h e post-war period has witnessed a staggering improvement in offensive weapons without a corresponding improvement in defensive armaments, Initially, this resulted in
a wide extension of the goals established for disarmament
negotiations. As, Ilowever, the unchecked offensive power of
the major states increased, there was a corresponding decrease in the goals of disarmament. GeneraIly the pattern
has been as follows: during the middle and late 1940s the
ultimate objective was virtually the elimination of war itself
international control
-the widest possible goal-through
of atomic energy. When attainment oE this end became progressively less likely, it was replaced by the more rnndest one
of reducing international tension and establishing "confrdence-building" first steps. Different means have variously
been sought, such as t h e disclosure and verification of armaments information, renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons, and measures to guard against a surprise attack. Since
1957 the mest viable goal in sight has been the limited one
of dimination of further radioactive co~ltan~ination
in the

atmasphere, This is onc of tbt p h i p a l reasom for all t8c
recent conmn with cemtian of nuclear tests.
Focrw Upon the Ahnt

The devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki brought h m t
to peoples throughout the world the incaleulabIe desmctioa
and amage that would result b r a any future war involving
the use of atomic b m k . CDupled with the memariles of all
the horrors and sacrifices of the just-forrctudd World War,
it produced a strong reaction against war itselfIfEven bcforc
the first General Assembly had time to consider the g e n d
principles of gost-war disarmament, it was called upon to
take immediate action on the problem of atomic weapons.
The newlyaeated Wnitd Nations Aroreic Energy Commk
sion was urged to devise "with the utmost despatch" a p h
for eliminating atomic weapons from natiud
For almost a decade control of nuclear weapons remained
the chief cornern of disarmament negotiations. The Western
sorlution, embodied in the proposals submitted by Bernard
M. Baruch on behalf of the United States government, m
for an International Atamic Development Authority to have
a monopoly on the world's production a£ atomic energy.
The Authoriry was to have exclusive control of all atomic
activities from the mining of raw material to the production
and use of fissionabk fuel. In addition to owning and managing a11 uranium and thorium mines, reheries, chemical
separation plants, and reactors, it was to have exclusive
authority to engage in atomic research. 'This plan was otkrtd
as more than just a means to eliminate the use af one terrible
weapon, It was, if accepted, to be the basis for extensive international cooperation for peace. In introducing the plan
Bernard Baruch 9aid:
In the elimination of war lies our solution, for a d tbtn will
nations cease to compete with one another in the T uction: and
uu of dread "secret" weapons which are cvduatJso~c1~
by their

J

18 Genenl

ADanbly Rcr. 1 0 . 2 4 Jan. 1946.

. ..

apadty to kill.
If we s u d in finding a suitab1c way to
control atomic weapons, it i s rereanable to hope that we may
also preclude the use of other weapons adaptable to mass detruetion, When a man learns to say "'A"' he can, if he chooses. learn
the rest of the alphabet, tama4

Fmm the Soviet pint of view the whole plan was "th0x"oughly vicious and unaaeptabk"; instthe USSR p ~ e k
d
a simple meaty outIawing all atomic weapons-but with mhimal control measures. When, in the winter of 1947, the
Barn& Plan was first considered before the Security Council,
Andrei Gromyko definitively rrjeaed it, mying: "Only p
ple who have lost the sense of realiq can seriously believe in
the p i b i l i t p of creating such mgementsa"wDebate on
the Baruch Plan continued for several years thereafter, but it
boiled dawn tr, little more &an a war of words. Technologid factors, which raised the problem in &e first place,
eventually made the plan outmoded: once a secret stockpile
has been accumulated, there ia no known method by which
it em be controlled unleas a nation voluntarily relinquishes
its supply. By the early 1950s not only had the United States
accumulated such a stockpile but so had the USSRSMC S cidly neither the Western powers nor the United Nations
disavowed the E m & P h However, the failure of the
United Nations in 1953 to re-hdbe9e the plan and the failure of the United States to mention it in its 1954 propoaeals
constituted tacit recognition that its was outdated.
T h e hI1 implication of the faiInre to establish international control over atomic energy was that henceforth no
disarmament meaty could guarantee a dimmed world. It
meant and continua to mean that international pence and
'
14 Statement of 14 Sum 1946 tci Uniocd Nationr Atomic E a q
RLpmauud in ~ ~ n a dcScmriq:
n A~ Col&ctia of i l o o l - v ~
1955, Subcoaodttce on Disarmamcat, h t c Cermnitkae on Pordgn RclatIoons, BA& CDng., 2nd Sesa (Washington, 196s)# p. 1%. This mllmion repmdaca many key docurtlcna Jnduding srrme orighally publish& in the
&cia1 TCEO& of United N a t h bdics. Hearafter dtad an US Donrmants.
1ESCOR: 2nd Ycu, No. e2, 115th M
5 Mnr. 1917,
rssow a h e.pmi.g im o m
b m b in !ii?*e
MCL
gmemmcnt gave norice d ita intalian tcl keep on producing atomic wtppom
until the llniled States qpcd to ban rbcm. b Pm&,
Orr tW.

.$-.

be haxi upon oorrditiogs other
than complete disarmament. Even if a comprehensive agreement on armaments were negotiated, and even if it included
a prohibition of the production and lase a£nuclear weapons,
there is no guarantee that one or more of the major pavers
might not have a reserve of nuclear h m b s ready-just in
m r i t y must ultimately

case.

The effect of this situation was to turn disarmament negotiations in the direction of estalslisliing oficient confidence
between the two sides so that a limited agreement might be
negotiated. An e h t in this direction had been started in
the Cammission for Conventional Armaments, but the deteriorating state of East-West relations during its lifetime
(1947-52) had hstrated agreement an even so much as a
work plan. In 1948 the Commission could only note that a
system regulating and reducing armaments could not be put
into effect in the absence of "an atmosphere of international
confidence and security."
Measures for the regulation and reduction of armaments which
would follow the establishment of the necessary degree oE confidence might in turn be expected to increase confidence and so
justify further measures of regulation and reduction.17

Prior co the Korean war two substantive p I m were offered
to stimulate this international confidence. One was a plan
proposed by the Soviet spokesman at the General Assembly
in 1948. Axldrei Vyshinsky called upon the permanent members of the Security Council to reduce by om-third all current land, naval, and air forces. The other was a plan
advanced by France in the Commissian for Conventional
Armaments in 1949 for the collection, verification, and p u b
lication of infomation on existing armaments and armed
forces. Vyshinsky's pian was rejected because it included no
27 Rc~Iutfonot

YCJ/II.

rusr R-t

the Working C ~ d t l c t 26
,
ul 1948, UnitEd Nations
p. 7. ~ u a t e din * n h w Martin, E o i L t i u r Mmrity: 1 pmg(Par& UNXSCO, 1952), p, 85.

means of verifmtion (d
was aLso C
d
i to a phibition of
all ammic
and the Fwach plan was rejected by
the USSR on the p u n & that it provided for no disarmament and would bc used merely for gathering secret inteIlip c c Momation. When the new Disarmamens Commission
began work in the spring of 1952, it continued dong essentially the striae lines as the Commission £or Conventional
Armaments, except that atomic as well as conventional weap
o m were indudd in a United States plan for p g m a i v s
and mntinuing disclosure and v&cation of armed forces
and armaments.
Negotiations in the D i a m e n t Commission during the
Korean war were particularly sterile, for understandable
reasom. Nmealling and mutual remiminations left no
room for serious debate. During the spring and summer of
1952, two propoQala were offered by the Wmt which, though
barely considered by the USSR at the time, marked a move
ment in a new direction. The h i t of these, offered on 28
May 1952, was a tripartite ppoeal for h i n g numerid
limitations w all m e d forces. Its objective was "to reduce
the possibility and fear of aggression and to avoid a dislequilibrium a£ power danguoug to international peace and security." No attempt was made to achieve a comprehensive
agreement. It suggested among other features a ceiling of
1.000.000-1,500,000 m e n each for China,the USSR,and the
United Stam, and of 700,000-800,000 each for France and
the United K i q g i ~ r n The
. ~ second proposal, offered on 24
June, was a Frmch one interlinking various measures of
disclosure and verification with various measure of disarmament in three stages. Novel in these approaches wars the
Western emphasis on a numerim1 limitation to armed manpwcr and on convmtianal disartnmmt by stages, with a
comesponding controP by stages. But any diplomacy had of
necearity an air of unreality while aggression was being
fought in the W s f i d d and arm thunselves were being
utilized in Karea to h t c r an East-West disequilibrium,

The years covering the work of the D-mt
Sub
are not d y d d b c d becaw of
their cmplexity and cht proliferation of difftrcnt p'opmds
emanating from the private =ions. In all, tht SuMhamittee submitted five reporn contairhg a total of sevmtyane
ducumefltary Bnnf!x.cs.

C d t t t e (1954-57)

P ~ o p a d sfar ' P W
Dwhg 1954 and early 1955 a spate of pmpmb and ceuntcr-propagalswas exchanged between the two rid=" They
came in m y form: warking p a p m m d , &lamtiom, resolutions. None was in any sense a detailed disarmament plan; they wnre mainly skeletons of possible plans to be
Mled in by future Disarmameat Cornmimion miwu or, in
swnc cases, by contemplated world disarmament eorikrmces.
The mast important of these outlines were thoae aubmirted
by the French and British jointly in June 1954 (which the
Soviet govenuncnt later accepted as a "bk for n ~ h tiolwm'),by the Western powers in March 1955, and by the
USSR in May 1955. In substance, agreement betwen the
*et
Union and the Westera powera r&td
ru &ivc
as ever. But in scope their p r a p d s all dad e l c m ~ t rin cammon. They a11 prooided far a mmpr&cnsive and ''pbsd*
dhmament p r q m n Both side agreed that them should
. bt a reduction in conventional armaments and fore- aa well
j, PC am eventual abolition of atomic weapom, sad tkat this
radDCtiw should takc place in stages. This appmeh was
aadorsed by the General Assembly on 4 November 1954
rPItb the mncuming vote of the U S R Not dme 1946 had
&em been a unanimous deckion by she great powcrs on a
t4bmammt ~emlution.
&bind this apparent unanimity, however, them remahad
I
the bdamental disgust and suspicion that one side would
t at the other's expease d d n g the application of the
&Merentstages. One partimlarlp important indication of the
hpmkidity of discasions during thi period was the facr
&at the United States, in a proposal of May 1954 for aa
'
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international control otgan to s u m cx)nvetlti'kmaJ and
atomic disarmament, implicitly abandoned the Baruch Plan
but offered nothing En substance to replace it. The United
establishment d a United Nations
States did call Ear
Disarmament and Atomic DeveIopent Authority. ?BE
authority, undm the United States plan,
would be empowered to function in a d c e with whatever
plan may be agreed upon for the mnml of atomic energy to the
extent necessary to ensure effective prohibition of nu&
weap
ons and use of nudear materials for peadid purposes ~ d y . ~

How atomic energy was to be eonmllcd so &at a prohibition could be enforced was not s p c i f ~ e d

AEIthe hrSE p t - w a r decade came to an end, technulogid
developnena in the a r m race mrnpclled a major reconsideration of the whole problem of dkmament. M u s l y
the main concern of all negotiations had k n international
control of atamic weapom, The r a d i d Baruch Plan had
migimUy been advocated on the ground that only it, ole
something compmb1t to it, could guarantee the a h l u t e
security from atomic war that w a u n i v d l y d a i r d Toward the latter part of the decade, Western spokesmen began
referring to the
of a "point of no rct.uml'--the
moment when no syswm of contra1 mn cnsure security
against violators because the amount of atomic materia1 in
exiatence defies accounting for and involve a "margin of
error" too great to accept. Strangely, there was almost no
discussion of this problem in the USSR's public statmeats
or in its press, By the early 1950s tbat point of no return had
been reachd
An additional factm reducing the likelihood of kt-tional control of atomic energy was the progressive integratian of atomic and conventional weapons in the armed foxes
of the United States beginning in late 1951, after a series of

~~

Rcprod~cadin iMd, p. 3w.

a m i c tests in Nevada proved for the first tirne that &rid
atomic weapons could be used effectively in combat. In
January 1952 President Truman's announcement of a fiveto six-billion dollar expansion of atomic energy f a c i l i t i e
the largest expansion since the formation of the United
States Atomic Energy Commission-indicated that the b t tleneclcs that had stood in the way of a vast program had
been surmounted. The United States' growing reliance an
atomic weapons was not limited to its own continental defense, but was, logically, extended to the North Atlanric
Treaty Organization, then looked upon as the West's principal buIwark against Soviet expansion. General E k m h w e ~ ,
then Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, intimated in
his first annual report (2 April 1952) that NATO forces were
being equipped with tactical atomic weapons:
The military farces we are building must be continually a
n
d
fied to kee pace w i h new weapons.
We are at the very point,

...

P

for examp e, of seeing a whale sequence of fundamental &an
made in response to the development of new typa of arms.
tendency in recent decades to produce weapons of greater.range,
penetrating power and destructiveness is ac~elerating.~

X

As the revolution in the destructiveness of wlgapons was
spinning itself out, a new revolution in the delivery of
weapons was beginning. During the 1950s, developments in
guided and ballistic missiles reached the point where they
could be considered operational. When combined with
atomic weapons, they added a new dimension ro the potency
of offensive weapons because there was no known method
of stbppieg or intercepting them.

New 'Pmehgd Pmpo~rdr
These scientific and miltnry developments were reffecttd
in I955 in a change in the scope of disarmament disclmiorw,
Insofar as atomic weapons themselves were not likely to be
~ D w u m c n t son Amcrienn FacSgn Relations, 1952, mi. Clma W.Baler
md Richard P, Stabbiw (New Yo* Harprr for the Council an Forclgn
R&tionsp 1953).

p. 189.
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b were directed toward getting: agreement
on more limited guarantees. This constituted a signibnt
contraction of the immediate aims of disannamenr, T o guide
the administration in io foxmulation of a new approach
Raidcnt Eislenhower on I9 March 1955 appointed Harold
mannaE. Staclaea as Specid Assistans to toe Resident fur Dm
mcnt. Mr. Stassen rn given cabinet status, an unpr&tntEd p i t i o n in United S t a t e history for an ofkial i p m - e d
with such a Limited aspect of f o r t i p poky.
Two major q t s of propaah made in the spring and summer of 1955 %eraldedthe change indkmament pole. The
k t was the important Soviet package prqmd, of 10 M ~ Y
1955. Sane of its pmvisiom were mnc&ions, such as fore
reductians at levels the West p r e w on e9 'March 1955
(1,000,1000-1,500,00O for C h h , the USSR, and the Unit&
States. and 650,000 for France and the United Kingdom).
It also accepted an Anglo-French pro+
that use of nudear weapas be prohibited at the time that 75 per cent of
the reductions in conventional forces was reached, and that
all. nuclear weapons be eliminated when 100 per cent of the
conventional reductiom had been carried out. In addition,
it mntaincd a new provision for cessation of nuclear weagbns
tars, as one af the first s t e p .
F a the b t time rhe USSR publicly h o w l e d g e d that
no known system d detection could b e t out a m t cache
of hydrogen or atomic weapons. "In such a sitpation/ re
ported the Soviet nqptiators, "security. .-amnot be wara n t e d since the possibility would be open to a potential
aggressor to acamulaw stocks of atomic and hydrogem weap
o m £w a surprise atomic attack on peace-loving States.'"
They repeated the theme that agreement was made difficult
in the atmosphere of "international tension and mistrust in
relatiom bttwten Stam."

cop1ts01lcd, c

.

e
sort m beirr erected even in regard to tht interchange of in usnial, agxi turd, scientific, cultural an8 other
delegations. Such a situation makes difiictrlrlt the attainment of
agreement wqpuding the admission by Stam to their enterprim,
Mtr~
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There appeared to be at the Geneva slamnit meeting gend agreement on the need to reducc international teasion.

The United States .position was emphatic that inspection
the way to accomplish thb. The Soriet Union, in spite
of the importance given to inspection in its 10 May proposals, emphasized rather that an all-European system of
collective security ~vouldreduce tension Pending an agreement on arms reduction and prohibition of atomic wgilpons
and the withdrawal of foreign troops from Europe, Premier
Bulganin called for a moratorium on further increases in
the armed forces of r i r k the NATO or the Warsaw Pact
powers. Unquestionably this Soviet m p M m was prompted
by the e n y of the Federal Republic of Germany into the
Atlantic Alliance only a little over two months before. Prime
Minister Eden offered a plan that would, in a limited pilot
area, combine the United States emphasis on inspection and
the Soviet concern with troop withdrawal. H e suggested that
wag

should consider whether we cannot set up a simple, joint inspection of the forces now eonfronting one another in Europe.
It should not be impowibIe to decide that over a spedfied area
haps a fixed d th on
to be agreed between w, extending
either side of the line which now divi es East and West urope,
there should be supervision by inspecting teae*, appointed by
the military commands on both sides'
we

r

3

No specific agreements materialized from the Geneva meeting.
After the summit conference of 1955, the dkmmment
discussions tmk a new turn. T h e Western powerrs emphasited that comprehensive disarmament was unattainable
since there was no way of controlling the elimination of
stockpiles of atomic weapons. Said Mr. Stassen at the third
session of the Sub-Committee: "The advances in modern
armaments, including nuclear weapons, have been so significant that much of the earlier discussions of the inspection
and control problems m y well be ou~naded."~
On 6 Sep
wspceEh at 21 July

23 Repduccd In

256

1955. Etcproduced In ibid, D-18,p. 10EI.

ibid., D-15,p. I#.
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t a n k 1955, therefore, the Unitcd States placed a memation on all of its pre-Geneva disarmament propwth. 'While
not txplicitly disavowing it8 pre-l[;eneva p i t i o m , the UI6td States representative d
e it dear that his government
was not r e a h i n g them either. The USSR, for its part,
continued to press for the B u l p i n p h , which was a re
statement of its 10 May 1955 propals.
When the issue came before the tenth General Assembly
there was general rerognition of the need Eor some sort oE
confidence-building measures. The Assembly d d upon
the Diaarmammt SubCommitcee to give priority to reaching
agreement on "tangible" measures of disarmament., auch as
the United States plan for exchanging military blueprints
and for mutual aerial inspection and the Soviet plan for
cstablisbing eontrol p t s at strategic centers. The USSR
opposed the resolution on the ground that it called for control measures without any disarmament measures.
The fourth and fifth sessions of the Disarmament Subcommittee, covering the pears 1956-1957, were the most
intensive and serious periods of general disarmament n e p
tiations since the war. Certainly they witnessed a wide varf
ety of proprwafs offered by all five powers, and at times a
definite narrowing of points at issue could be observed on
isolated questions. But this period warp also one of canfusion
and aimlessness on the part of the negotiators. Weapons
testing was proceeding at a furious rate, and almost every
day seemed to foreshadow new developments in arms technology. The principal difficulty centered around agreement
on control measures to supervise any disarmament program
and on what subjects were the k t for a start on disanna-

In term of the scope of discussions, the h t two years of
work in the Sub-mittwere characterized by widc,ranging proposals. Each of the five pow= offered outline
p@ covering first-step mmurerr in lthe four chief area
ent: reduction of conventional arm and force,
prohibition of nuclear weapons, meadura to guard against

surprise atrack# and cstabllishment of a control md b p
tion q s t e m to gwantcle o m e af any a-cnt.
All
the major Westm pmpwals intcmehtcd thee bur p b
lems, d i n g agreement on one contingent upon a p e m t ~ t t
on one or more of the athm. The USSR d m t e d begencral propods and more limited ones dealing with
fic problems independently (e.g, regional dkxmamctlt, c t s
sation of tests, budgetary reductions).
The intensity of debate and variety of p p d s , b o w c v ~ ,
in no measwe compensated for their failurc to aolvt the
technological and politid problem that had frurtmtcd
agreement in the past, No one was able to offera d d a c t m y
technical mlution-much less a political on-to
the p b
lem of guaranteeing a ban on the production of nuclear
weapons or guaranteeing the reduction of st&.
There
remained the tactical and strategic problem of Wcstm reliance upon a world-wide system of military h a as opposed
to Soviet reliance upon massed armics prepared to fight in
territories contiguous to the USSR: at what level were
manpower and conventional. arms to be stabilized so as to
permit a remaining over-all balance of strength? And finally,
there was the political problem of continued mutual h d l ity and suspicion, which denied the conditions necessary to
establish a control and inspeaion system, On one isolated
issue, a cessation of nuclear tests, some headway was made.
This will be considered separately below.
Proposals for a three-stage disarmament plan were a f f d
by France and the United Kingdom on 19 M a c h 1956 and
far the first steps of a comprehensive plan by the Unitcd
States on 3 April. A two-stage plan for conventional a r m mena and for partial measures was offered by the USSR
on 27 March. Western objections that the Soviet control
features were inadequate were countered with Soviet
compIaints that the West wanted control (for the purposes
of furthering intelligence information) without genuine
dkmament. A French h u l a , "neither control without
disarmament, nor disarmament without control but, prsivcly, all the dismmment that can at present be con-

t r o I I d m met the problem in principle but could net be
worked out in practice. The Soviet mution to this vicious
circle was a beginning agreement on "partial solutions."
Among the items mentioned by Premier Bulganin aa "'ripe"
for first-step disarmament were agreement on a limit to
conventional manpower and discrJntinumce of nudear
tzsta.=

T h e Western pawers generally insisted upon the interrelation of all phases of clkmmnwt, though a United States
&ah working paper o%ered in Loedon on 3 April 1956 did
suggest two new steps that the five powers might take
"promptly." They were (1) exchange of a lirniwd technical
mission to analyze problems of control and inspection of
cunventional armaments,and (2) creation of a a m a l l demonstration test s f control and inspection including p u n d and
aerial survey in n limited, non-sensitivearea in the United
States and in the USSR. Furthermore, on 3 May 1956 the
Uniued Stam warned that
cornprehe~ivecbmamwt and drastic reductiom can only k:
camxed out d e l y as paralIe1 regress is made In the wlution of
important litical issues in e world, ar o&efwiaetbe dangers
of war wou d be increased*
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C;onsideration of dkmament at the Gcnaal Assembly was
essentially a holding action. Not wanting to disturb in any
way the possibility of an agmment in the Sub-Committee,
the eleventh k m b l p did not endorse the proposals of
either side. It recommended rather that prompt attention be
given m a11 the d o u s proposals submittd Such a recornmmclation could be accepted unanimously,
Hapcs were high when the S u b C o d t t e c reconvened in
1957 for what was to be its longeat and mast intensive ttession. Initially, debate centered around a aeries of propaah
&cd
by the USSR on 18 March and by the United States
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the next day. Neither contained any f e a ~ r e tss~tiallp
s
new

except that the United State formally reiterated a propad
for research on the peaceful use of outer space that it had
made before the eleventh Assembly, Two major new g t s d
proposals were o8Eered during the year--one by the USSR on
$0 April and the other by tbc four Western powers on 29
August. Each set contained new items in the way a£ ampromise but both were tied to conditions in successive
stages that were unacceptable to the other side.
While general in scope, both new sets of proposals were
offered with the idea of impltrrteating partid measures at
first and then going on at a later date to complete, comprehensive disarmament, Again the theme of "decreasing existing tension" and restoring "a minimum of international
confidence" was heard. The differences proved insumount
able, however, and in the fall the Disarmament Commission
could only report a deadlock. At that time the principal
areas of agreement and disagreement could be s m c d up
as fclllows:
h conventionaI armaments there was agreement on a firs&stage 2,500,000-manpower level for the USSR and the
United States and 650,000 far France and the United Kingdom;* but Western insistence on progress in the settlemeat
of political kuca as a condition Em hrther reduction was
unatxeptablc to the USSR. There was agreement on the
principle of txcbangc of information as a means of control,
but disapcement on how it waa to be d e d out. In principle both rides favored a suspension of nuclear tests kith
conmob; there was no agreement on the nature and timing
of such controk, however, and the USSR particularly
objected to United States insistence on agreement to cease
the production of fissionable fuel before a test ban became
permanent. Both sides accepted rhc principle of ground and
=The S d c t man
Intruded Chiao. The IS2 propads of
r c n ~ % d e d i t U i o I W 1Lumntryo.aitof ~
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air inspection to guard against aurprisc a t e theg d i e a d
on the area to be inspected.

Once the comprehensive disarmament talks c~Ilapsed,discussions namwed considerably in scope. For over two y m
the Disamament Commission did not meet and there was
no concerted discussion of comprehensive disarmament apart
from speeches in tbe Genaal. AsemBly. Instead, two isolated
issucs were the subject of several conferences, They involved
measures to prevent surprise attack and cessation of the
testing of nuclear weapons.
The question of surprise attack was revived in the spring
of 1958 as an aftexmath ta a Soviet charge before the Security
Council that United States Strategic Air Command flights
over the Arctic region threatened the security of the USSR
During the debate United States Am-dor
Henry Cabat
M g e introduced a proposal recommending the establishm a t of a zone of inspection over the Arctic to guard against
surprise attacks. At about the same time, Praident E k n howler, who had long been concerned with the problem of
"open skines," asked P d e r Krushchev to permit a meeting
of experts to study the "practical problems invo1ued8' ia
such an agreement. T h e Soviet gommmcnt rejected the
United States p r o p 1 in the Securiy Council but did agree
(in July) to a meeting of experts.
T h e "Conference.cd Experts for the Study of Poaible
Meajves Which Might Be Helphrl in P r w a n g Surprise
Amek'" met in November and Dmmber 1958. The Western
powers held its mandate to be strictly u c h n i d Thc Soviet
r'cpracntative, however, treated it as primarily a political,
ntgotiating body. At no timc during the confmcnce was there
P meetbe; d minds on iu basic purpwc. and the mnference
eventually adjourned d m die.
By far the greatest eomidcrarion since 1957 l
m been given
to the problem of a nuclear test ban. Nuclear testing k t
bcearne an htamtianal issue in 1954, EoUowing the th-

nudear expIosions conducted by the United Stam in i&
P d c Roving Grounds in March 1954. India m k d tht
quation in the United Nations, expressing great concern
over the " ~ e f E e c f s " of nuclear wrplesiom. The lerfiafl
government asked that the Disarmament Sub-Codttec
give special consideration to a "standstill agrettmnt"
among the testing powers even bcEm a control system was
devised; and it called for full publicity of "tht extent of
desmcdve power and h o w effects of rhesc wtapom, and
also adequate indication of the attent of unknown but probable effects."" Asians in general became increasingly vehement critics of nuclear weapons testing. Particular concern
v
m expressed in Japan, whose nationals had been not only
the h t wartime victims of an atomic attack but also the k t
serious casualties of the testing program." The A s i a n - A k a n
conference held in Bandung in April 1955 appealed in its
find cornmuniqu6 to the "powors concerned" to reach an
agreement on suspension of testa pending an agreement
prohibiting the manufacture of nuclear weapons?
During the next three years warld-wide pressure for such
action rnomted. This was to be reflected in the intenseand sometimes heated4ehtes at the eleventh, twelfth,
and thirteenth General Aiisemblies. The focus of the argument was the possible deleterious effect upon present and
future generations of radioactive contamination of the -05phm. At the tenth Assembly, Indonesia and Syria groped
that all nuclear weapons tests be suspended until mme was
known about their radiation efEects. Instead of taking so
d i e a scand, thc h b l g geated a fifteen-mmk permanent SeienrSc Committee on h e Effects of Atomic
Radiation to assemble, compare, reviav, and disseminate
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infomation on obsemed levels of d k a c t i v i t y in the environment and the effects of s ~ &
radiation upon man and
his environment.

b o n g the nudear powers rhemsc1ves the initiative in
=king a mt-'Banagreement came Emm the USSR. Discantinuance of nuclear weapons t a u was included in it9 10 M a y
1955 propals before the D b i w n e n t SubCbmmittet as
one af the first measures in a dharmamcnt program. Later*
on 27 March 1956, the USSR d l 4 for a test cessation
"forthwith," independently of the attainment of agreement
on other proMems of disarmamat. Premier Bulganie, in his
extensive correspondence with President Eisenhower during
1956, wntinued to press for an independent agreement. On
11 September 1956 he wrote:

I should also like to direct your attention, Mr. President, m so
important and pressing a problem-me which is a pan of thc
atomic problem-aa that of discontinuing tests of atomic and
h drogen wea as. I t is a known fact that the discontinuation
o such tests o a not in itself require any international contra1
agreements, fox the present state af science and engineering
ible to detect any explosion of an atomic or hy&e
it may be set off. In our opinion this simation makes it possible to wpsrrate the roblem of ending tests of
atomic md hydmgea weapons fmm J e *nerd bmblm, of aharmament and to solve it independently even now, without tying
an agreement on this aubject to agreements on otber dimmam a t pmblmm.g
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Premier Bulganin'9 assdon that controls to detect a test
violation were unnecessary was flatly denied by the West.
Anglo-French eountcrpropls on 19 March 1956 called for
a test cessation* under controls, only as part of the third
stage of a comprehensive d i s a m t ~ l agreement.
t
A second
Western qdikation was added by Ambassador Lodge
be£ort the C ; e n d Assembly in January 1957: bcfonr:

nwLcar test exp10~ionscould cease, there would have to be
an agreement on a cut-off, under an agreed control system,
in production of hionable fuels for nuclear purposes. He
defended thk requirement on the grounds that
even il all tat explosions were s t o p F , the stockpiling of atomic
and hydrogea weapons would conunue. If the tests were discontinued, all efforts to reduce radio-active fallout in those weapons
would also be discontinued, and thoae being stockpiled would
contain far larger amounts of radioactivity than they would have
otherwise. Finally, additional nations, even without nuclear tests,
would be manufacturing their own nuclear weapons using techniques already k n o ~ . ~
The Western insistence on the need to continue testing until
a cuts% agreement and a control plan were negotiated
encountered strong criticism not only from Eastern European delegates at the eleventh Assembly but from many of
the leading neutralist nations as well. V. K. Krishna Menon,
speaking for India, maintained that even the smallest increment of external radiation in the atmosphere was harmful
because it increased the mutation of genes in human reproductive organs. The United States found itself in an ever
more uncomfortable position on this issue. Ambassador
Lodge remarked somewhat apologetically: "We know that
nuclear testing has given conceq to many sincere people
throughout the world. We believe-these fears are ill founded,
but we respect their moti~ations."~
Neither the United States position nor that of those who
wanted an immediate test ban was fully supported by the
evidence published by the Scientific Committee on the
Effects of Atomic Radiation in mid-1958. It tended to back
up the Western argument on the relative harmlessness of
testing by revealing the comparatively small addition to
radioactive materi* attributable to nuclear tests-particularly in comparison to the large amount created by the
+cUnited N a t i o ~G
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pacehi w+ ot X-n)r.o n the other hand, tiw rrpat r m r ~ d
the
of gmetic hgtm in any increment of radimctivit7.W
One major obstacle was elidrrated when, on 14 June
1957, the USSR offered for the first time to permit control
p t s on its tmitary to suptmk a tar cessation. Following
the W e t announcement of a provisional unilatml ccsisation in March 1958, the United States found itself under
considerable pressure to negotiate a test ban without awaiting agreement on a cut-off in h$bnable fuel producti~n.
Prmident Eisenh0w.a then p r o p e d to Premier Khruahchev
the mwocation of a p u p of &team and Western experts
to study the specific mntrol measures. Premier Khlrushchev
agreed, and the errsluing conference concluded that it was
"technically feasible to cstnblisb
a workable and effective
control system to detect violations of an agreement on the
worldwide suapeesion of nudear weapons tests.'Y1 The fid
report described the scientific and technical requirememu
fw# wch a system. The problems and prospects of the second,
morc political, conference %@ill be evaluated in a later

...

chapter*
Tbe year 1959 thus found adwe dLsmummr nqptiati~ns
bcjAg c m i & out in on47 one Wtcd phare of the whole
p b k m Same amsideration to tht wcrsll p M e m w a
gi~rtlby the GcnePP fanilpr ministcrs"eting
in the early
=lt in m a g m m r ~'to
~ ~refut
anr in the ten-naticm cilarmnittee
v, toa, in t h e Camp David tnllur in -brr
disa?mament, thagh the diallls of &&
b-hm
haw nm yet been rtwaled.
That there is a universal popular desire for aomt brcalt in
the intensity ob the current anxu race is beyond qumtioI1'.
Tht nu&bated) related to cbrmamcnt in the four-

teenth G u 1 4 Assembly and the severat important p r o p
sals put f m w d in this world-wide setting are sufficient
witness to &is fact. But even intense popular desire docs not
guarantee serious cornideration of a viable agreement. The
old problems-political and technoIogical-remain. They
will be considered in the follawing chapters, before an aaisessmeet of the current digarmament picture is attempted.

The Problem of Confro1
IN SUBSTANCE the conemporary problem of disarmament is a
pxobIem of control to ensure that agreement will not Wvertly
be violated. T h e United States insists that it will a c p t no
disarmament agreement that is not a controlled one. Behind
this h a n d lies che fear that a~:uycontroIlcddisarrnarnent
apernent wiIl full the dem&mtic nations of the Westere
coalition into a false sense of security; that the USSR will
maintain a strong military posture while the West reduce
its strength;and that the USSR, in the absence of a military
deterrent, will ultimately expand its iduence by aggressive
means. Furthermore, there is the 'belief that an uncontro1led

agreement may promote suspicions of violatiom which in
turn could lead to recriminations g d an increase instead of
a deaease in intfnnatimaI q m m .
Control, in short, is to he &s&$titutefor the mutual urwt
that is lacking among the'-siptasics. This leads to the
fundamental dilemma of modem disarmament: amawl L
demanded as a substitute for mutual trust;. yet a high d e p x
of mutual confidence is neccssay before a control plan can
be put into effect. Modern history prbvides' very little guidance for solving this dilemma. W l c disarmament negotiations have a lengthy history, the number of cornurnmated
agreements is YW small. And in no case has a heely negotiated disarmament agreement included a control system to
guarantee its observance.
This analysis suggests that control is principally a political prob1cm. It is not enough that the major powen be
agreed on the short-run political status quo to achieve a disarmament agreement; there must be a more basic longer-run
understanding on each side that the international ordm 9s it

exists is going to endure. Peaceful coexistence must mean
mc3re thm a propagandistic slogan: it must involve an achowledgment of the legitimate right of all nations and social
system to exist. Otherwise the egtablishmcnt of an adequate
control system is extremely doubtful, if not impossible.
The major problem centers around the attitudes and outloak of the Soviet Union. In h e last analysis any conaol
agreement must be fully reciprocal. T h e USSR must accept
the same limitations on its national sovereignty that tbe
Western powers are willing to accept. It must look upon a
controlled disarmament plan as offering more over-an s e a =
rity than is offered by its awn military establishment,
Furthermore, its scientists and technicians must agree with
those of the West on the specific requisites of the control
riystern. As we shall see, neither Soviet ideology nor the
statements and behavior of Soviet negotiators indicate that
it does look upon control in this light.
In view of the preoccupation that both sides, the West in
particular, have had with the concept of control, it is perhaps surprising to note how limited the negotiations on an
actual control plan have been. Tbe negotiations over the
past fourteen years have really been preliminary skirmishes.
Most of the speeches, debates, and p r o p a l s have concerned
general aims, bases for future discussions, and the like.
En only three instances at most cam it be said that the
major powers got down to serious discussion of a control
plan. The firsttook place during 1946 in the United Nations
Atomic Energy Commission, where the details of a plan to
control the world's production of atomic energy were
wrestled with. Twelve years later represenrativ& from the
East and West met in Geneva m consider the technical
means of preventing surprise attack. (In view of the basic
Iack of agreement on the c~nference's terms a£ reference,
one might omit even this as an instance of serious discussion. Finally, there are the two Geneva conferences to devise
a control system for prohibiting nuclear tests. A brief review
of the Soviet reaction to s p d f k mntrol plans illustrates the
nature and extent of Soviet opposition to any control.
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In the Baruch Plan, the USSR was confronted with the
mwt far-reaching type of conml plan possible. Its purpose
was to guarantee that atomic energy would be used for
peaceful purposes only. T h e means proposed was internationalization of alI facilities producing fissionable fuel, including plants and reactors supplying energy for peaceful
purposes as well as for atomic bomb, because "there is an
inrimate relation between the activities required for peaceful purposes and those leading to the production ol atomic
~ e a p o n s . "In~ addition to ownership of all Fissionable materials and production facilities, Mr. Baruch's Atomic Develop
ment Authority would have had complete inspection,
accounting, and licensing powers."'
In principle the USSR also called for international control of atomic energy. But the Baruch Plan was totally unacceptable. The USSR insisted upon national ownaship and
management of atomic energy facilities, accepting, at the
most, international inspection of these facilities. In 1946
internationalization of aII atomic energy production would
have involved a greater sacrifice for the United States, which
then possessed such facilities, than Eor the USSR, which did
not. Why was the latter so adamantly opposed? Principally,
it would appear, because it feared that the plan would tend
m preserve the United States monopoly of atomic weapons.
Moreover, the USSR did not vusr the operations of an international controI authority that would regulate an atomic
industry once one had been established in the Soviet Union,
T h e Russians could not conceive of an international board
in which they were a minority without a right of veto that
muld distribute the benefits of atomic technology as fairly
to the USSR as it would to the non-Communist nations of
NRcprt to thc Semdty Camdi, 19%. in UNAEC, OR: [lst Year$ Spce.
1, Part II, p, 11.
r
o
&
!
dctair at haw the plan of mntml muld .vF brr. a lid at each
titage of pmduc~ion,re &mad Report m the Srrvriq coandl,% SIpr 1947.
in IBid, 2nd Year, Spec. SuppL, Part TX.
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the W e s ~htirei Gmmyko m i n d no words in getting to
the heart of the Soviet objectian:
ft ia easy to understand that the granting of such righa to auntroll organs would mean a complete arbitrariness a£ these organs
aod, first of all, of those who would be in a pasirion to command

..

a majorit in these OF.
The Soviet Union is aware thnt
there w' be a majmty in the mnml organ which m y take
one-sided decisions, a rna'ority on whose benevolent attitude tow d ae~ovin
union
swiet
Qinnot count. ~ h fane, the Soviet Unian, and probab y not d y rhe Soviet Union,
-not
allow that the fate of iu national er:momp be h d c d
cwer to this arganu

d

the

people

Control of a different sort waa d i d in 1958, when
the two sides met to study measures concerning protcction
against surprise attack. Western experts presented detailed
scientific and tdnieat infmmatian describing posgiblc
means of surveillance and observation to prevent a potential
surprise attack by missiles, ainr;rft, naval d t , and ground
forces. Ammg the techniqua that the Weatern powers saw
as p i b l e wtrc aerial photography, radar, electronic reconnaissance, idha-red techniques, the use of ground forces,
and acoustic, magnetic* and pressure techniques for underwater detection. In describing a " p i b l e system*' of detection against surprise attack by aircraft, the West suggested
the necessity of a rather extensive petration into the
domestic activities of the controlled states. For example, at
almost all major airfields used by long-range aircraft thae
would have to be ground observers who might even have to
o h m e the takc-off and landing of all such aircraft, so that
the exact number of planes airborne at any time as we11 aa
the length of time each individual craft had been in the air
couId b b o w a m
These technical questiom were never considered gcriouslp
by the IJSSR V. V. Kunetsov charged on the last day of the
conferc~lcethat
uscoa: Znd Ye!& No. 22,115th Mtg- 5 Mar.
Qw d m i
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during the come of our labour&h e the Western reprsmtatives obstinately attempted to dra the Coderence into a consideration of nothing but C O R ~questions, a control whose
obvious purpose was to get as much military infarmation as p
sible about the newest weapons such as, for example, long dIstance rockets.*
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Neverthelm, the Soviet representatives did o& a series of
prop& that contained control features. Some of these
featwes paralleled the Western suggestions, although taken
as a whole they clearly reveal the suspicion and distrust the
USSR has always manifested regarding comprehensive conml arrangements. It did agree to the establishment of
ground control posts at railroad junctions, major ports, and
on main mads. It also called far the estabIishment of aerial
photography zones in Europe, Asia, and the United States.
But even these features were M e d to political mnditionr
that the West could not accept, such as a omthird redutction
of troops in Europe and a prohibition of nudear weapons
and missiles on German territory.
In describing the scope of control againat surprise attack
the Soviet government noted that "the main principle"
underlying any ground contpl operations or aerial photography should be "respect far the fuU mereign rights d
countries on whose territoria ground control posts and aerial
photogt-sphy wiLP be e~tablis$ed.''~Its plan for ground
inspection fully mnformexl to this principle. For example,
the number of control offioervl at earth post could not exceed
fom, of whom half had to be nationals of Sbe country being
o h d . A maximum of six posts were to be establkbed in
the USSR, which meant that at the most twelve nonSoviet
c~ntrolaffkms would be respansible far &eking an tht
movemenu cd all land forces in the territory of the USSR.
In addition, the pwt m d e r would be a citizen of the
satebeing controlled, as would all auxiliary pemomc1. Thc
conference adjourned, howewr, without giving d o u s can.sideradon to specific p~llpogala
I

ausIbid, Anaa 15, p.9
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Supam?hbg o T& Ban

On the question of establishing a mnml system to oversee a nuclear test ban, as least the first hurdle has been surmounted. Except for the question of underground e x p b
rsiom, there is general agreement on the technical requisites
for controI1ing a tat ban. But developments at the second
Geneva conference indicate that Soviet opposition to a genuine control system has not yet been overcume.
At the first technid conference, a network of approximately 180 fixed control posts was recommended. Ten of
them would be on ships, and from 169 to 170 would be landbased throughout the world as £allows: North America, 24;
Europe, 6; Asia, 57; Australia, 7; South America, 16; Africa,
16; Antarctica, 4: and 60 on various islands. T h a e control
stations would be so equipped that they could detect a
nuclear explosion mywhere in the world. An estimated
thirty specialists, in addition to an auxiliary servicing staff,
would be required for each post. Furthermore, the control
system would include air sampling by aircraft carrying out
regular Bights along north-south routes over the weans.
Underground explosions of low kibtm-yield posed a s p e
cia1 problem bemuse their signals, as recorded on seismic
instruments, closely resemble the signals a u w d by earthquakes. Thus provision was made for dispatching onsite
inspection teams to those areas where seismic signals could
not clearly distinguish an earthquake from a v i b t nuclear
test. An international control organ would supervise and
coordinate this whole system.
But several problem remain to be solved. For example,
what exactly is to be the camposition and authority of the
central control board? By what vote are the various kin& ot
decisions to be taken? W h o shall man the concrot posts?
What criteria are to determine how many on-site inspections
arc to be made? What specific data shall be taken into
account in developing these criteria? These are among the
principal questions now under consideration in Geneva.

I

There L agreement that the intcrnatioaal oontrol mmmission should have seven memhas. The USSR, the Udted Kingdom, and the United Statm, aa pemmemt
would elect four other nations to serve on a rotating
But agreement b lacking on who the four non-permanent
members should be as well as on the voting procedure d the
oogunission as a whoIe. Until late k t year the USSR insisted
that the permanent members have a veto on such vital quations as policing (including the decision to &patch on-site
inspection tams) and on BBml and budgetary m m Thc
application of a vem by the permanent members on the
control commission would, in Western eyes, cripple the
whole system of controk automatic and prompt inspection
of any explosion suspected of being nuclear is considered to
be a vital element of the whole plan; an inadequate sptem
of financing the control commission's options could also
r e the ~;ommision's
work. Tbc USSR's general dcfcmt of
the veto power is that the Western powem will have an
"automatic majority" on questions involving the Soviet
national interest. France's forthcoming entry into rhe
nuclear club is likely to exacerbate this fear.
Two Soviet c a m p &
have been o h t d as a way out
of the R n p . Premier Kbrushchev last spring publidg
approved Prime Minister M a w s suggestion for advance agreement on a specified number of m u a t veto-&
uri-arite inspections. Currendy under conaideration is the
exact number of such inspectiora A marc sweeping p r o p
sal to eliminate the veto wtirelg was made last December.
T h e USSR agreed to perrnit all mhtantiw decisions to be
made by a two-thirds vote oE the commhion 5f, inter rrrllo,
the four non-pmnment members were to include two reprc
satativles from Warsaw Pact nations, one from the NATO
aounaits, a d one neutral, thUg giving the USSR and im
dies their long mught-after "parity" of repmentation. As
of now thc Western powers are adhering: to their position
that tht mn-permanent membaa of the control lxlmmiarian
&odd include representative from one Wmtcm nation,
onc Sovict ally, d two neutral nationsI thus ~mblishhg
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an over-all representation of three far the West and two for
the East, plus the two neutrals.
Closcly r e l a d is the problem of how to select the teams
for on-site inspection and what authority they art to have.
The Western powers want trained, permanent mobile inspection teams ready to hvacigatc at a moment's notice.
The USSR har insisted that the team could act only in consultation with the government on whose territory the inyestigation takes place. They would presumably be c o m p e d of
nationals born the nation under inspection accompanied by
"foreign specialists" from the other side, ks the USSR sees
it, without such limitations the inspection teams would have
license. to roam indiscriminately for =pionage purposes.
Also under contention is the cornpition of the personnel of the permanent control posts* As noted, she general
Soviet position has been that this perswnel should be primarily indigenous, with the inclusion of a specified number
of 'Toreipers." The USSR has agreed to as m y as ten
foreignem out of the suggested total oE thirty per p
t
.In
the Western view, Russians inspecting the Soviet Union,
Americans the United States, Frenchmen France, and so
forth, is tantamount to self-inspection and violates the basic
purpose of a control system. The United States and the
United Kingdom have been working on s compromise
whereby Soviet nationals would comprise that third of the
total complement which is devoted to sewicing and, in addition, approximately a third of the te&ni-l positions, in
p
t
s within Soviet borders. But they insist that in thest
pasts all suQervisory positions be uccupied by Wtsterners
and that the remaining technical positions be filIed by
British, United Stam, and "third party" nationals. Naturally, a reciprocal m g e m e n t would be made far the mtrol
posts in the United States and United Kingdom.
Last December the %Get representative at Geneva agreed
to accept the Western compromise plan for stding of the
control pasts if in turn the West would accede to the Soviet
demand for parlty on the seven-nation control commission.

Barstc Sooiec Fe5rn

A recurring theme runs through all Soviet positions:
Soviet distrust of majority voting in any control group. In
the three instances where a control system has been consideTed in aome detail, Soviet representatives hare insisted
either upon parity of representation between East and W e t
or on the right of veto in the contemplated international
control organ. In the last analysis they have refused to be
bound on any question involving a vital national interest.
Both the development of a domestic atomic energy industry
and the maintenance of a military establishment immune
from foreign scrutiny fall in the category of vital national
interests*
Under present circumstances, any international control
group reflecting the realities of political power would inevitably include a majority of non-Communist nations. Deei$ions involving actual and potential interests vital to the
USSR would have to be made continuously by a control
board the majority of whose members would represent social
and economic systems the USSR considers inherently hostile.
Any conflicts would ultimately have to be resolved by representatives of governments, and it is assumed that on all
major decisions the capitalist nations would vote as a bloc.
In Soviet eyes, the basic economic and politid conflict
today is between the Soviet and the capitalist systems, which
are felt to be irreconcilably o p p e d . In the USSR's view,
there is no permanent middle ground between the two, nos
is it p i b l e Ear "neutral" representatives to arbitrate political and economic conflicts between them. ~ X Mfgr
, the
Soviet Union, representation on a control board along the
k e s proposed by the West would be inherently inequitable
k u s e the capitalist nations and their allies would have
several times as many votes as the Communist nations.
Repeatedly, Soviet representatives have brought up
charges of p i b l e bad faith on the part of a contra1 agency
Typical was thc quation asked by Andmi Vyshinsky before
a General Asscmbly meeting:

If it was admawledged, as the supporters of the United Stam

lan did acknowledge, that evidence of bad faith might W b l
&
given by the govammno, why not abowkdge b a t ruJ
i
bad faith might equally well be shown by the staff of the control
agency in its adrmnisuationW

Q u e s t i o ~of~ good and bad faith are, to the USSR, related to
political judgment, not to moral character or personality,
The Soviet leadership has evinced extreme doubt that repremtatives of communism and capitalism can be neutral on
important political questions. Prauda, for example, gave as
one of the masons for Soviet rejection of the United Nations
plan for international control of atomic energy the argument
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that it would be impossible to find '"independent people" to
run the control agency.mThis disbelief in the possibility of
impartiaIity of states or statesmen when questions of differeconomic and social ~ystemsare involved has been a
constant feature sf Soviet foreign policy.

The 'Garnesrnanrhipa of Negotiations
IT
xs EASXER to iiCCOUM f i x the inability of the major powers
to reach a disarmament agreement than for the tenacity with
which negatiatians have been carried on over the p t fourteen years. United States insistence upon a ayJtem of control
and Soviet resistance to it loom as the principal reason why

all disarmafnent efforts to date have p
m abortive. Arms,
after all, remain one of the principal means by which national security is maintained. A government can afford to
let down its defenses in the face of a threatening p w a only
at its own pwil. Disarmament effom mmt of neceasit~evoke
the most conservative responses from those responsible for a
nation's safety.
This analysis operates on the assumption that a r m races
are mom a product than a muse of international tension,
Admittedly there is a circular effect: Nation A in fear of
nation B increases its armaments. Nation B,in colllsequence,
intensifies its military build-up lest it fall behind nation A.
This adds to nation A's insecurity and a counter-build-up
rakes place. And so build-up is added to build-up.
Perhaps the strongest argument for a disammmt agreement 39 the need to break this vicious circle. Why not, it
is argued, let disarmament be the lq4nniug of a reduction
in international tension? This argument would be more
easily sustained if it were possible to measure exactly the
military capabilities and intentions of all nations w that
m e fosm of parity or quity of military h c c could be
established But one nation's security may, unfortunately,
be another's hecuriq. T h e history of both inter-- and
pt-war digarm;rment efforts; pfoves the near impossibilitp
of thb task. There arc too many immtaaurable Eactors. What

criteria of nationd size are to be used to gauge thc p p c r
strgngth of an army: land mass, population, industrial capacity, gross national product, overseas possessions? What
weight is to be given national animosities and maditiond
historical fears? In the words of behaviorists, how precisely
c m "threat pexception'9be measured?
Another set of problems plagues the proponents of disarmament-ta-reduce-tension.How can different military instruments be compared? What, for example, is the manpower equivalent of a missile m e d with a nuclear warhead? Are domestic police or trained reservists to be considered part of a nation's arrny? These and similar questions
have been stuclied earnestly by many authorities without
satisfactory answers. It follows that the only possible way to
produce a genuine, entirely stisfactory disarmament agreement is to eliminate or mitigate the political mdlicts giving rise to the tension. It is more than likely that this would
lead to unilateral disarmament without any agreement. The
prognosis for a comprehensive disarmament agreement
while the cold war lasts is not very good.
What, &en, accounts for tbe persistence of these negotiations? Are policy makers so blinded by their own words
that they have failed to see the real difficuIties and operate
under some form of self-delusion? Or. worse yet, have the
leaders of the major powers been engaged in a coldly cyniml
game of deluding domesticand intenantiom1 public opinion?
Neither hypothesis accords with the faas.
No simple hypothesis mn explain something sa complex
as these negotiations carried on over a period of fourteen
years by several nations governed by many different administrations and leaders. T h e complexity of the subject is underscored by the facts of the rapidly changing technologp of
weapons, the shifts in i n m i t y of the cold war, the growing
importance of independent Asian and African countries, the
changing political complexion of the United Nations, and
the different expectations and aspirations of dite groups and
leadem throughout tht world. Nevertheless, in spite of these
&anga, certain generalizations about disarmament do

ancrgc. It irr poaribk to observe in all the ebb aud i b w of
negotiations, throughout the periods of total dtadlodc a d
near agreement, a pattern that at 1-c p d & y accounts Ear
much of the content of the propads.

,.Forem~)~t
among the haam that exptain the pedstmcc
-of the negotiaticm is public opinion. From the moment of
Himahha, the h m t of a future war i n v o l ~ guse of the
atomic weapons was made clear*and the demand that atomic
weapons never again be used haa persisted arnong peoples
throughout the world. Part of this demand ha, of course,
bccn an outay apinst war itself. A weariness with war and
armed confiict was a natural and inevitable reaction to the
titanic struggle between the Allies and the Axii. In August
1945, following Japan'ls stmender, demobilization and disarmament, along with restmarion of peacetime eronomiw,
were principal national objectivm. The r a t i o n against
atomic weapons found expression in the speeches made
before the first General Assembly and in the unanimous vote
creating the Atomic En=
Commission. Later that year
the Assembly, again unanimously, produced a str of prim
dples governing; the general regulation and reduction of
armaments.47So impressed were many with this achievement
that the Asmnbly sessiun was referred to at the time as the
"'dissumament Assembly." Since then disarmaunent has been
~~)ntinuously
on the Assembly's agenda
The feeling of urgency about reducing and regulating
armaments, parSicu1arly nudear weapons, gradually subsided as the hmtilitiwr of the cold war deepened, only to be
mamused by the successful testinga of the hydrogen bomb
by the United S t a t a and the USSR in 1952 and 1953, respect i d y CT o the awesome power of the A-bomb was added the
thcomicat~lyunlimited destructiveness of the H-bomb. Prime
Minister Nehm pointedly warned &e major powen that
4 q C c s a o l Aorcmbly Ru.U 0,
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the world did not look with indifference upon the nuclear
arms race:
These ate horrible prospects and a$ea us nations and poplerr
everywhere, whether we are involved in wars or power b1oa or

not. . . . There can be little doubt about the deep and wides read concern in the world, articulariy among peoples, about
t ese weapons and their drea ful c~nsequences.~
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Fuel was added to the fire of public indignation by the prob
lem of atomic radiation. India first raised the question in
April I954 before the Disarmament Commission. A month
later the Trusteeship Council received a petition from the
"MarshaIIese Congress Hold-Over Committee" expressing
alarm a t the increasing danger horn United States tests in
the Truss Territory of the Marshall Islands. Since then the
question oE the potentially harmful effects of the tests upon
a11 peoples has been a regular-and at times extremely erne
tional-issue before the General Assembly. The most recent
Assembly expressed "the profound concern evinced by the
peoples of all countries regarding the testing of nuclear and
themanuclear weapons" and requested states to refrain
from testing.+#
General Assembly res~lutionsare not, of course, legally
binding, Their political and moral influence can nevertheless be great. Every government vigorously seeks to obtain
United Nations approval of any of its policies that m a y be
under consideration. A n~otionof censure, condemnation, or
even disapproval against a nation's poIicy is, if nothing else,
a serious propaganda defeat. For the United States and the
USSR this is all the more true because each is engaged in a
global campaign to win allegiance and support. As a reflector
of world opinion the United Nations is imperfect; it represents governments, not peoples. But its actions come nearer
to representing world consensus than any other instrument
that exists.
Because of the appeal that disarmament has for world
public opinion, negotiations have inevitably become in@. tit., US Docurnen&, pp. 247-249.
h a . lUMB WV), 21 Nov. 119. See pp, 2911-M.

a Extracts of spcecb.
Menera1 k m b v

voW in the propaganda warfare between the USSR and
the Western powers, The purples of propaganda have virtually dominated all negotiations to date, with the possible
exception of those involving cessation of nudeax tests. This
is not to deny the sincerity of some efforts to reach agreement. But sincerity of purpose i9 no solvent for the hard
realities that have stood in the way of an agreement. As these
realities have become apparent, each side has used the negotiations to discredit the other and put upon it the onus for
failure so reach an agreement. Each side bas sought to p r bay its own proposals as fully reasonable and those of the
other as unworkab2e or unfair.

In effect, t-bamament negotiiatiom t h ~ t l v e shave bp
weapon in the eold wax. Speeches made in m
d
#ion,committee, and plenary Assembly have mote often k n
designed m influence different segments of opinion &an to
ma& an aeo-odatian
with the other nations represented
at the conference table. Both East and West have beoolne
masters at the art of appealing directly ta peoples over the
h a 6 of their panments.
Soviet pliq in negoxiating international contml of
atomic energy c~emplifiedthis new kind of dipl~macy~
The
hviet altcmatira to the Barueh Plan, typified by tht St&h a h "peace pldge*'tu "ban the bomb," wert too esrtrem;t
to bc mmidercd seriaus1y even by the Sariet Unioa Their
p w p e wag to ide11t;fySoviet polieg with the same ultimate
@--elimination of the atomic bomb-without d i n g thc
red sacrifice necessary to achieve that -1, Soviet resolutions
and speecha were designed to atate actitndes, to convey
and reiterate the theme that the Saviet Union stocrd for thc
absolute prohibition d a t d weapons and that the United
&am refusal ta renounce the bomb p v e d the aggressive
nature af its foreign policy.
One of the important features of the wag Saviet d h m a ment policy in the United NatioAa was d 6 d out warr the
00m.c a

g e n d uniformity of presentation before dl the various
organs where the subject wa9 debated. f n general, there was
no significant dikfertotiation in the content md tone of
50viet speeches in United Nations M a according to the
particular functions of the General Assembly and its committees, the Security Council, the Atomic Energy Commission,or the Disarmament Commission. The wual procedure
was for the Soviet representatives to present, with few exccp
tions, the same kind of long, tendentious, and hostile
speeches before every body, large and small.
Beginning with the propmala for international control of
atomic energy, both sides have developed and refined the
technique of utilizing the discussions for propaganda pur~ e s This
.
might be described as the "gamesmanship" of
disarmament negotiations. A cardjnal feature of this "game"
has been to reject the proposals of the other side without
appearing to sabotage the discussions.

".

Evwp plan offered by either side has contained a set of
proposals calculated to have wide pupuIar appeal. Every
such set has included at least one feature that the other side
could not possibly accept, thus Eorcing a rejection. T h e n the
proposing side ha3 been able to claim that the rejector is
o p y e d to the idea of disarmament in toto. T h e objectionable feature m a p bc thought of a the "joker" in every series
of P P ~
This tactic accounts far the paradox that, over tbe past
fourteen years, the two sides have appeared to be m w h g
their differences on some issues even though fundamental
differences have prevented them b m cons-ting
an
agreement The proposals were never meant to be considered
in isolation, If the negotiators could afford to come closer at
times, it waj only because a joker that had outlived itsr usefulness had been discarded; meanwhile, a new one was being
inaduced that would again make overall agreement i m p
rib1r. Some of the jokers, of course, m a y have been intend&

''

L'

as bargaining points. Others may have been rdectkms of
hcompIetely resolved conflicts within the bureaucracies of
the groping governments. The faet remainsI however, &at
they m e d to prevent agreement. T h i s pattern iar clearly
more evident in the case of the Soviet pmgwals than in those
of Britain, France, or the United States becaw Soviet o p p
sition to m a t aspects of general dimmament (with mntrob)
is &reamthan that fif the West.
A detailed review of all the p r o p h in order to o-e
&ir. pattern is yupawible j r ~a summar), analysis rmch as
*IS. T h ~ r eexamples will ~ l a r f 3 b x (1) international OMI~XT,~
d.atomrc, en-*
(2; the problem of limiting armed manp e r &$ (3)the
of a nuclear test asmti011.
For reasons outlined earlier, the Baruch proposals for intexnationa1 control of atomic energy wene anathema to the
USSR. They nevertheless confronted Soviet foreign policy
with a very d o u s cbdlenge in terms of world opinion. In
one fell swoop the United States pro@
striking at tht
m t of national sovereignty and hrwa eliminating the
mawe atomic warfare, it not global conflict,
Seemingly, there were only three alternativa open to the
Soviet government: to h e p t the Western plan, reject it, or
p r p p a more viable akmativd But since none a£ t h e
cholcm fully s$tdaSaviet n d , another way was hund that
had 7 poIitical logic rif its o m . The Soviet gomxtieat
demanded an immediate and unconditiona1 prohibition of
the production and we of atomic weapons. In e&ct it asked
the United States m abandon the bomb without asswane
that the USSR itself would hot secretly build one. (Nor,for
tbat matter, would the Soviet Union have bem assured a£
United States good faith.) Prohibition d atomic weapons
without a workable control sptem to ensure Soviet mmpli8 1 ~ muld
: ~
nwer have been accepted by the United States,
as the Kremlin was well aware, This sine qcur non of all
M e t p r o p & on the subject was the propagandistic jolter.
It is unn-,
far our purposes, to chdIenge the sind t y of the Baruch Plan. If adopted, it wauld have M T V ~
the United States national interat well. It wculd have for-

m

ever precluded the USSR from carrying out the research
necessary to produce the bomb; and the United States would
always have been able to preserve the knowledge of the technical requirements for production-just in case. It may be
questioned, however, whether the United States Congress
would in fact have gone along with the plan had the Russians
accepted it.
As it was, the Baruch Plan, too,contained a joker: United
States insistence that the permanent members of the Security
Council abandon the veto where questions of sanctions
against the violators of the control agreement were raised.
This demand may have been not so much a joker as a bargaining point to be dropped if the USSR accepted all other
features of the plan, but the United States never did offer to
abandon it. Soviet resistance to any tampering with the
veto was well known. Elimination of the veto was neither
an original feature of the Acheson-Lilienthal Plan (the precursor of the Baruch Plan) nos a vita1 element of the control
system. If the USSR had accepted this plan (and while it is
now clmr &at the idea of ~ntenzationalownership of dl
atomic facilities was totaIly repugnant to the Russians, that
could not be assumed in the mid-forties), there would have
been no need for eliminating the veto ta punish a violator.
The Western powers, under Article 51 of the Charter regarding the "inherent right of individual or collective selfdefense." could have taken the necessary action on their own,
although the veto might, of course, have made it impossible
to obtain the moral support of a Security Council resolution.
On the question of determining an agreed maximum for
the armed forces of the major powers, the Soviet p r o p a h
were more subtle but equally impossible of acceptance by
the West.Manpower limits have not been the subject of
active debate since the Disarmament Sub-Committee sessions
of 1957, but future consideration of a comprehensive plan
wilI inevitably re-activate this question. Any reduction of
armed forces must be carried out in such a way that no
country's over-all military strength is reduced proportionately more than any orher nation's. ?'he problem is knotty

I.

i
;

1

b u s e of the difEculty of establishing a military equivalent
of a given quantity of men arid other fighting units, such as
ships, aircraft, tarh, and cannon. Determined efforts in the
inrer-war period to establish such an equivalent £ailed
m the post-wmrd Wax I1 period this problem h been
complicated by two basic ham. First, the USSR has maintained a considerab1y larger army than has the United Stam.
To compensate far this the United Stam has concentrated
on the development and stockpiling of atomic and nudear
weapons. "Massive retaliation" and "nudear deterrence'*
refer to policies felt to be necessary to cope with an e n m y
capable of putting more manpower in the field. Second,
Soviet land forces have the advantage of being conctn2~atcd
in E m p e and Asia relatively close to the areas moat likely
to k a m e the battlefields in a future conflict. United States
manpower is dispersed in bases throughout the world. This
dispersal force the United States to maintain a minimum
of between 2,000,000 and 4,500,000military men in order to
keep ail its bases in Europe, Southeast Asia, Japan, the
Middle East, and Africa, in addition to its hemispheric

defenses, adequately staffed.
Andrei Vyshinsky dramatically raised the question of
limiting manpower in a speech beforc the third General
Assembly, calling for an over-aII one-third reduction of
troop by the major powers. T h e USSR's numerial su+
d t y in armed manpower was so great that a proportional
cut would have left the Western powers in a position of permanent Xeriority. A proportional reduction of forces was
thu, totally unacceptable ro hem. Yet for y n n ihe Soviet
p m r n e n t insisted upon a one-third proportional rduction of troops as the basis for any limitation of manpower.
1n its p r o p & of I0 Mag 1955, the USSR finally abandoned its insistence upon a flat percentage reduction and
agreed to a maximum figure as desired by the three Western
powers. It proposed a reduction of Chinese, Soviet, and
United States forces to 1 ,OOO,M)O-1,500,000
men, with 650,000 each for France and the United Kingdom. T h i s proposal
had the appearance of a concession insofar as these were
90L

virtually the exact figures proposed by the West in 1952 and
by France and the United Kingdom again in 1955. But this
concession was made conditional upon agreement that
"States possessing military, naval and air bases in the territories of other States shall undertake to liquidate such
bares."m In non-diplomatic language, the Soviet Union was
demanding dissolution af NATO and SEATO, a condition
unacceptable to the West without a prior settlement of the
outstanding political conflicts between the two sides. Since
then, withdrawal of United States forces from Europe has
substantially replaced the one-third cut as the unacceptable
demand in Soviet manpower proposals.
A renewed effort to solve the manpower problem was made
in 1956. At this time Soviet representatives were stressing
the 1,000,000-1,500,000 figure as the most suitable for a
manpower reduction by the major powers. That figure,
though previously acceptable, was now categorically rejected by the U n i t d States. Harold Stassen explained to the
Sub-Committee:

..

When . the Soviet Union speaks in its proposah of force levels
that had been suggested [by the West] under one set of conditions, which it says specifically it does not accept, it has not
moved to meet the United States in any real sense.5'

The United States now set a maximum of 2,500,000 for
its own and the Soviet armies, with further reduction conditional upon settlement of outstanding political issues. T h e
USSR held to the old figures and countered an 27 March
with a proposal that agreed to consider the problem of
reducing conventional armaments and forces without linking the agreement to any form aE nuclear disarmament. This
in itself marked a reversal of its decade-old policy of combining conventional and nuclear disarmament. Several months
later Andrei Gxomyko announced Soviet willingness to
accept the higher United States figure as part of a larger
agreement unconditionally banning the use of nuclear weaw Reprodud in US DocumtnLs, p. 387.
61 United Nations DaE. D6183, 4 May 1956, Annex 12, p. 32.
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ponab dcsmction of nuclear t~rxkpizcs~
and a wst cessation.
No mention waa made of a contra1 aystrm and no apemeat

rated
Again in London a year later, an even more intense saiw
of mqptiaticm on manpower limitation taok place. P;nrticakm emphasis was given to the problem of stagEd di9armamcgt. Xn mast cwa the unacctptablc conditiw w e e in the
rrecond or third a m g a of the pro&
agreement, For
example, the USSR claimed a serious d o n to compromise
when on 90 April 1957 it
to accept thc United Stattll
figure of 2,5QD,000 men without a prior agreement to oeast
the manufacture of atomic weapm. But as a new condition
it demanded agreement on a ateond-stage level of 1,500,000
men for the three large land powern. It in effect deferred
the breakup of NATO and SEATO to a later stage.
During the summer of 1957 h e United Stam couatmpro@
with condidom of its own. It suggested 2,500,000
men aa a hitatage reduction, to be Mowed in later stagerr
by redudom to 4,100,000 and 1,700,000 men if aad when
there waa progress toward the solution d politid hue.
With the Soviet rejection of this condition, negotiation Em a
reduction in manpower reached a dead end.
T h e history of negotiations for a separate apeement banning nudear tests shows cansiderably more balance between
Soviet d United States w e of gamesmanship. The initiative
Em a test ban agmmtnt originated with the USSR in its
10 May 1955 plan. It mlled for a discontiauance of tests "as
one of the first measures.'Wn 30 April 1957 the USSR a@n
singled out the problem of nucIear tests and asked that it be
m1vd '"withmcdelay." Weithtr proposal mentioned the esrabhhment of a control system to supervise a test -tion,
although any Western consideration of a test cessation was
cantingat upon agreement on control,
A major change in the Soviet stand was made on 14 June
19W,when it revemd d1 pftpious poliq and agmd to
accept thc supemhion of an international commission. with
o o m l p t S actuaIly tO be stationed on Soviet territory.
This change immdately put the United Stam on the defen481

siw and permitted the USSR to seize the propaganda initiative. Probably no single issue has served the USSR better
than that of test cessation in repairing the propaganda defeat it suffered in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commision. T h e Achilles heel of Soviet propaganda has always
been its resistance to control. In pushing the idea of a test
cessation, with controls, the USSR has been able to capitalize
on the anxiety felt throughout the world, particularly in
Asia, over increased radiation in the atmosphere.
Stopping nuclear tests in the absence of a broader disarmament agreement was not originally Iooked upon with
favor by the United States. Its initial argument had been
that continued testing was needed in order to develop a
"clean" nuclear bomb and to perfect anti-missile rnissiIes.
T h e United States now accepted the new Soviet proposal
"in principle" and in turn attached several conditions. The
Western powers on 2 July and the United States again on 2 1
August 1957 demanded, as part oE an agreement. cessation
of the production of fissionable materia1 for weapons purposes and establishment of a control system to guarantee
such cessation. President Eisenhower had previously proposed a ban on the production of fissionable fuels, but at
the time it had not been a condition for a test cessati0n.~2
This condition was the joker in the United States response.
In view of the known Russian objection to controls over
Soviet production of atomic energy, such a condition would
not easiIy be met. Moreover, the difficulty of establishing
controIs on a cut-off in fissionable fuel production would
have serhusly delayed agreement an a test cessation.
Pressure was intensified against the United States when,
on 31 March 1958, the USSR announced a unilateral cessation of its own testing program. (Not coincidentally, this
announcement followed the end aE a Soviet test series and
immediately preceded the United States Nevada t a t series.)
In the spring of 1958 President Eisenhower proposed to
JzLetter to Marshal Bulganin. 1 Mar. 1956. R e p d u d in Reference Documents, D-26.pp. 166-168.

Premier Khrmhchev that technical t a b limited to the dt&on
of nuclear blasts be held, Without explicitly a h duning its demand regarding production of fissionable fuel
(this condition was officially abandoned early in 1959), the
United States ktter thus opened the way for the poltical
talks on testing now k i n g held in Geneva. The West's sole
condition for cordusion of an agreement is now the =tab.
lishmmt of an effective control system. As already noted, the
cyrren<obtacles to agreement center around the 1peci6ics
of such a system;
These three illustrations by no meam exhaust the examplea of the gamesmanship of disarmament negotiations. In
its fuU operation the art of disarmment negotiations is a
m a t subtle and complex p m w . It is a task not taken
l@tly..The stakes are too high. Even where the prospect of
agreement &'highly remote, she issues are most seriously
considered and the debate is m i e d on with the greatest
intensity. Disarmament negotiation is just one t001-but a
very important one-in the foreign policy arsenals of East
and West in their struggk to build a world in their own

-.
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Watershed?

To JWDCE by she recent outpouring of new proposals and
major speeches, the year 1960 may be a; watershed of sorts.
A new round of dkmmrnent negotiations was made p+
sible by the Ebt-West apeanent last summer to establish
the tenaacion disarmament committee, which has scheduled
the first of what promises to be many meethga for midMarch 1960. Some of the ideas and proposals the new committee will consider are already known;athm are still being
developed in national policy groups. But once again tho
discussion may be veering toward comprehensive, rather than
partid, disarmament.
Of the proposals already announced, those made by Remier Khrushchev on 18 September 1959, in a speech b e h e
the Cenml
have received the greatest publicity.
Actually, they encompass three different, though not mutually exclusive, plans. T t ~ c&st is "that, over a period of four
years, all States should carry out complete disarmament and
should divest themselves of the meam of waging war." Land
armies, navies, air forces, atomic weapons, and missiles, along
with overseas bases, general st&, war ministries, and even
military ~ m l would
s
cease to exist. Ta ensure complimce*
there should be an international conm~body "in which d l
States would participate,"
A subsequent elaboration of this plan, submitted by the
Soviet government, &led for achievement of "general and
complete" disarmament in three stages: reduction of armed
forces and conventional arm in the first stage; complete disSFor text, see GAOR: 14th k.
799th
, Plenary Mtg.. 18 Sept f959.

bdment d armed forces and military bsures in the second;
and completion of tlae mmahhg, and mmt signihnt, s t e p
including destruction of nuclear weapom, in the
In case the West r e j d thb far-reaching propad, R e mier Khrushehw proposed an alternative p h for p a
dismnamenf- In addition to calling far agreement w a cesas&n of nuclear testing, the partial plan h five elements:
(I) creation of a eane of control and inspeaion with a r d w tion of Eoreign troop in Western Europe; (2) d m of an
atc~n~fret
zone in Central Europe; (5) withdrawal of all
fareign troops from Europe and liquidation of m i l i m bases
on foreign territories; (4) conclusion of a non-aggresrirnn
pact between the NATO and Warsaw Pact s t a t e ; and (5)
an agreement on the prevention of surprise attack. Tht gap
between total and partial dkumament is here rather wi&.
With she exception of the third p i n t , this alternative plan
would not actually involve a reduction of either side's EOTCCS.
Nur, with the exception of the fifth point, would it involve
an extensive system of eonmh,
As a third suggmion Premier Khmshchw, almmt o h d cdly, re-introduced the Soviet 10 May I955 p p a h as
mmtituting ""a good basis fm agrtement'ko partial partiaalament rneauresPLL
British Foreign Secretary SeIwyn Uoyd also made a majar
p e d before
~
the United Nations, which unfortunately t a d
td to get lotit in the welter of publicity attending the Soviet
Premier's a p e d the fallowing day. Mr. Lloyd's pro+,
while not rn explicit in its call for complete dis;rrmament a
&at suggeatsd by Premier Khwhchev, does prick for
~ornprehensivedisarmament, It would be implemented in
thee gages, the first k i n g essentially a stage of negotiating
means and ends, the second a partial implcmentati~n~
tbt
ehird aompIete implementation. With one important a c c p
HUniM N a h Doe. Al4219. 19 sept 1959.
aC)n 14 Jan. 1960 Frernim Khmhchev amornoEd tD thc Supmute t k v k
ciut the USSR would unilarcrSUy reduce Ira r t m b q m y Erora l#W!M to
bp 1981. Thfs rtdufdon Mn bri h V k t m e d [wm to a p d -
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tion, none of Mr. Lloydk proposals is new. Taken as a whoIe
they would cover every phase of the armament race." At
least two elements of his plan require extensive controls: a
cut-off in the production of fissionable material for weapons
purposes, and inspection against surprise attack, both of
which are recommended to begin in the second stage.
The creation of a peace force is the new feature of the
Lloyd plan. Though not entirely novel, it does constitute a
departure from recent effortsat disarmament. It marks a
revival of the plan envisaged by the authors of the United
Nations Charter linking disarmament with collective security.
Another potentially important pr~posal-but for partiaI
disarmament-was made by Jules M d , of F m c e , at the
Assembly. Mr. Moch compared the cutrent slate of missile
development to that of atomic development in 1946 and
urged that a high priority be given to measures prohibiting
the development, manufacture, and pasession of all vehicles
capable of delivering nuclear weapons before a "point of no
return" is reached with respect to these, too. The vehicle
would include satellites, rackets, supersonic or long-range aircraft, ocean-going submarines, aircraft camiers, and launching pad~.~?
The United States has not announced any major p r o p
als, but it is clearly using this period for a major reappraisal.
President Eisenhower may have indicated the direction of
this re-evaluation when he tvrote to Senator Hubert Humphrey an 17 November 1959 that the risks of not reaching
agreement may be greater than the risk of imperfect charmament controb:
%They provide for (1) ccss~tionof nudear mting, (2) a c u t 4 in the
p u c t i n n of fissionable fuel for military p q m m , (3) &nadm a n p m
imitations (4) banding wcr designated awrarnmts to the custody of an
internatfanal control o~ganiation,(5) duction of canmtional mammts,
(6) transEe~of military srockd at fissionable fuel to non-weepom ua. (T) intion against sufpattack (8) use of outer space for peaceful purparcs.
a ban on the manufacture and u r ok all mapons of rnm dcsmction,
and (10) international mnmI ol military budgets. GAOR: 14rh SCgk, 198th
Plenary Mtg., 17 Se t. 1959, paras. 47-60.
51%. CAOI: I& h
,
1st Gmtte., ) O W Yli, 24 Oa 195%

;9;

'me best and most a r e f a y daborated disarmament agreemmts
..atelikely to carry with them some rbks, at least theoretically, of
evasion. But one must ponder, in reaching decisions on the very
complex and dieticult suk$ect of arms cmuol, the enormom risks
entarled if reasonable steps are not taken to curb the interna-

r

tional c a n tition in armaments and to move effectively in the
direction o disamament.~

That some re-thinking has already been done is clear from
thr: important change in the United States position concerng prevention of surprise attack. Ambassador Lodge told the
irst Committee of the fourteenth Awembly that bis governent would, in contrast to its previous stand, be willing to
talk of political matters "concurrently" with technical ones
at the forthcoming meetings of the ten-nation committee.5g
hrrhmore, the United States has m&ed
i m stand on
the Soviet demaqd for parity in negotiating groups; in addition to accepting strict .parity on the ten-nation committee,
the United States mcptetl a larger Soviet representation an
the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
space than it had previously been willing to.
In July I959 Charles A. Coolidge was appointed by President Eisenhower to make a study on behalf of the Departments of State and Defense on "comprehensive and partial
measures of arms control and reduction which, if internationally agreed, would contribute to the achievement of
United States national security objectives."* The report of
the Coolidge committee is expected in early 1960 and will
provide one sf the major bases for United States policy propcwab in this field at the projected summit meeting in Paris
in May as well as in the new disarmament committee.
Despite the evidence of new thinking, however, it cannot
be said that any of the fundamental problems previousIy
posed has really been resolved. The "spirit of Camp DaviB"
has not erased the elemental suspicions each side has of the
other, nor is agreement on meaningful international inspec58 Reproduced in The N m Y w k Times, 27 Nov. 1959.
MCAOR: 14th SesJ., 1st Cmtu., 1027th Mtg., 14 Oct. 1959, para. 8.
6f1The Netu Ywk T h ,90 July 1959.

tisn and control yet a realistic prospect. The Khrushchev
proposals speak of "controls" to be established "in conformity with the stages in which disarmament was carried out."
Nevertheless, in tbe same speech Premier Khrushchev made
it clear that what the USSR "still advocate[s]" is "strict control over the fuIfiIment of a disarmament agreement, after
such an agreement has been reached." In the present atmosphere of distrust between states, said the USSR in its elaborating statement,
any deliberate attempt to advance inflated control requirements
and especially t o r t . . . mntrol before disarmament as a prr
requisite for any rsamament measures, is tantamount to blocking all approaches to the solution of the problem.

Implied in this argument is the Soviet fear that a strict
system of international inspection and control would give
the West considerably more benefits in terms of penetrating
Soviet secrecy than it would the Soviet Union in obtaining
Western secrets. And in view of the relative openness of
Western compared to Soviet society, this fear is justified.
One can go still further. Philip Noel-Baker, winner of the
1959 Nobel Peace Prize, argues that Soviet unwillingness to
accept controls is related to the scope of the proposed disarmament agreement-that is, that the economic and political advantages that might accrue from any agreement thus
far proposed by the West have not justified the sacrifices the
USSR is asked to make." As indicated in an earlier chapter
of this study, it is evident that to the USSR controIs of the
sort the West demands threaten to subvert the Soviet system;
thus the price of controls may seem inordinately high and
the question is whether any disarmament agreement is psible that will appear to the USSR to be worth this cost.
'Is, however, the absoIute "fool-proof" system of control
heretofore demanded by the West essential? In fact, is it
technimIIy feasible? In an analysis dune for Columbia Zlniat See hia Thc Arms Race: A Programme for World D k r t ~ r n e r t t (London,
Stevens. 1958).
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poIicy~makersare seriously d d e r i n g what wodd

bc the igwedients of a dimmamar. agreemeat Ebat would
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p r d n g peoples detmnined to change the social system in
their m~ntries."~
The problem of reaching a disarmament agreement is
further complicated by new technologiml developments in
the arms race-particularly the apparent Soviet superiority
in the long-range missile field. Some United States officials
haw admitted that thae will be a "missile gap" at least between 1961 and 1963. The United States is under pressure to
develop an adequate counterforceand would thus be unlikely
to Eavor a control plan, such as that suggested by Mr. M d ,
that might deprive it of the opportunity to perfect its missiles
and anti-missile missiles, even were the USSR to limit iwIf
in a like fashion.
In these circumstances, the United S t a m will be more
dependent than ever over the next two or three years on its
Strategic Air Command bombens and intermediate-range
missiles to maintain its deterrent striking power. This may
necessitate continuing dependence on overseas bases, alrhough some observers have seen in the development of such
weapons as the 1,200-1.500 mile-range Polaris missile, which
can be fired from a submerged atomic submarine, the possibility of a greater and more flexible military deterrent than
fixed bases; at least one such submarine is scheduled to any
operational missiles by the end of 1960. When more of the
United States ICBMs,having a 5,000-miIe range, have been
produced, it wiIl be possible to utilize bases in continenca!
United S t a t e for a retaliatory nuclear attack. In the interim,
the United States seem to be counting on its presumed
superiority in diversification of weapons and on the strength
of its international alliances.
To a certain extent, these considerations will affect the
Western view of the possibility of controlled "limited disengagement" in Europe, as called for in the Khrushchev proposals, or a variant thereof such as has k e n advocated by
Prime Minister Maanillan. From the Soviet p i n t of v i m ,
this would be more acceptable because Soviet territory would
Article
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of Soviet milk
not actually be invoIved, although the
tary withdrawal from cx)untzies in Eastern Europe might be
a caw for concern, Militarily, too, the pro+
has an
elernat of fewibitity in that it would not enmil a ~ignifiwr
diminution of the forces on either slide; it amounts more to
a redeployment than to a reduction af forces. Although rhm
b widtnce that President Eisenhower as well as Prime Minister Mamillan may be thinking along the lines of ~ ~
"thinning out" in Central Europe, such proposals 4 1 almost surely require sumt consideration of the smtw af
Germany, with all the pitfalls that this involves,
Prssrures on rlss G r w Potmrs

Dcspite thege rather negative remarks, there are strong
pressures upon the major countries both from within and
from other countries-especially the smaller nations-to
make m e headway on disarmament. T h e most effective of
these pressures has ken, as noted, for cessation of nuclear
testi~g.No fewer than four out of six of the fourteenth
Assembly resolutions on disarmament related to testing of
nuclear weapons, and all passed overwhelmingly. One urged
intensification of the work of the Geneva Conference to devise a test control system and another asked for a moratorium
by all states on all further tests (passed by votes of 78-0, with
2 abstentions, and 60-1, with 20 abstentions, respectively).
The other two reflected concern lest the "nucIear club" grow
and, in all likelihood, become less responsible. F m c e , which
has already announced that it will imminently test an atomic
dwice in its Sahara territory, was particularly requested to
refrain born p i n g through with its plans. In view of the
strength of the Western alliance, the vote of 51-16 (with 15
abstentions) against France was surprising,Jtr another signifia t resolution, the Assembly approved an Prish proposal the
intent of which was to o p p t Eurther dissemination ~f nudear weapons to those nations not now possessing them.
Although this was watered down to a simple suggestion that
the ten-nation disarmament committee consider the matter,

n
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the concern evidenced for the "nth country"prob1em was
rear and universal. Not one dissenting vote was cast.m
There are other pressures an the three nuclear poweft
that relate to this "nth mtion'"prob2em.
Politically the influence that these powers now exercise inside their alliance
systems would be diluted as their allies came to produce
atomic weapons. Smaller nations able to produce such weap
ons would be capable of exercising a kind of "atomic blackmail" to which even the largest nations wmld not be immune. A year ago this problem was referred to as the "fourth
country" problem; today it is the "nth country." It is too late
to prevent France's entry into the nudear dub. But other
countries are now, or soon will be, in a position to embark
on programs of their own. One report lisw twelve countries
as being "technically able" to do so "in the near future''Belgium, Canada, China, Czechoslovakia, France, East Germany,West Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Sweden and Switze r I a ~ ~Sooner
d . ~ ~ or later this list will surely be expanded. It
is evident that with greater dispersal of atomic know-how
will come greater risk of accidental or irresponsible use of
atomic tveapuns.
This problem is particularly acute with regard to that
emerging giant, the People's Republic of China. There is
considerable belief in the West that the USSR is no more
eager to see the People's Republic develop atomic weapons
than is the West. Thus it may be that an agreement on
cessation of testing would provide the USSR with an excuse
to deny information to its ally. An agreement would not,

.

W k ,respcctiwly, General Asmmbly Res~lutions14Q2A and 14028 (XI ,
?ZO Nov. 1959, and 1380 (XIV), 20 Nov. 195 .
The o l c r two resolutions continued the 82-member Diaamamtnt Commission, with an oblique indication of approval of the ]&nation committee
(the dehatc made it cleat that the members consider rhc Assembly a retaining; ultimate authority For approving any agreements reached), and uqcd
arhirvemcnt of a consiructivc wlution to the problem of gcnenl and wmpletc disarmament: Resolutians 1403 (XIV), 41 Nov. 1959, and 1378 (XIV).
21 Kov. 1959. 1379 (XIV)
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&For summary- of repon done for American Aadcmy of Arts and SdPaces. see Howard Simons, "World Wide Capabilities &r Producdon of
Xuclear FVeapons,'" S u h l (Imtitule for &ralc@c Studin), Vol. 1, No. 4
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however, solve the problem of what could be done if China
developed atomic weapons an its own, and under the circumstances no agreement that dicl not indude it would be
effective. What is done with respect to France wirl provide
an important precedent, since that country, too, has ipdicatd it would be -1 toward an agreement reached without
its participation
The most hopef~lprospect in the near future has been
for an agreement on a controlled test cessation, although it
i9 dear that bask questions are grill outstanding even here.
Last November, the Soviet representative agreed, after many
months of r e b a l , to consider new scientific data-principally the information gathered bp tbe United States after its
I958 "Hardtack"~tetseries, which indicated that the report
of the first Geneva conference on a control syster~lhad underestimated the dificulty of detecting underground shots.
Subsequent studies in the United States have shown the
theoretical possibility of carrying out tests in large underground excavations that would be indistinguishable seismographidly from earthquakes. Soviet technical experts meeting in Geneva have virtually rejected these latest studies,
which seem to point to a need for a more extensive control
system than originally envisaged. As of January 1960 no
solution to this prablem was in sight, and agreement on an
annual number of veto-free inspections had been held up
' by theninabilityto agree on the technical implications of the
new data. All this raises again the fundamental question,
discused earlier, of whether and to what extent the USSR
can accept inspection and conml on its territory and whether
the West mn accept the minimum controls that seem to be
the maximum the USSR might allowWm
As the military implications of a t a t ban become clear,
the United States, too, seems to show signs of diminishing
enthusiasm for agreement. Some milimy opinion in the
United States holds that the further development of tactimI
MPresidenr Eisenhower mggrsrcd in April I959 that immediate agreement
to ban t a t s in the atmosphere or under water, which would not
q u i r e an clabomte control system. This pmpwal haa w W bscn m i d .

be reached

weapons, the miniaturization of missile warheads (nece9pary
in view of United States failure to develop as powerful
propellent fuel for missiles as the USSR), and an understanding of the technical-military effects of detonations in space
all depend on renewed testing. In an effort to offset Soviet
missile superiority, work is going forward on perfection of
anti-missile missiles with atomic warheads, and this work,
too, might be retarded by a permanent test cessation.
On the other hand, test cessation, strictly speaking, involves no real disarmament or fundamental change in the
war potentia1 of either side, and agreement on this limited
question should therefore be more easily reached. Test c m tion tvould primarily limit the further development and
perfection of weapons already possessed in great abundance
in the United States and the USSR, In some aspects of nuclear arms production a point of saturation has undoubtedly
been reached.
The question of whether or not there will be agreement
on a permanent, controlled test ban will ultimately depend
-as do other larger disarmament questions-on the balance
oE needs. Is the Soviet Union's suspicion of controls greater
than its need to reduce the drain on its economic potential
that is represented by excessive defense expenditure? Is the
West's fear of remaining behind in the missile race greater
than its need to appease domestic and international pressure
to stop testing? Is it possible to arrive a t an agreement that
will be of equal advantage to each side? Would a start on
any aspect of disarmament, such as a test ban, be sufficient
to reverse the trend of the arms race or to Iwen the risk of
accidental war? In the absence of agreement, each side has
left itscIE room to maneuver. The United States, on 1 January, announced itself "free"t0 resame testing, though not
without prior announcement. France continues to move forward on its projected testing. And the USSR has indicated
that its unilateral cessation would not apply if any W e r t m
power, presumably including France, conducted a test.
Should a control agreement ending nuclear tats be signed,
it would constitute the first real breakthrough in the four-

I
I

'

teen-year disarmament impasse. It might we1 establish a
climate for further agreements, such as a thinning out of
forces in Central ~Gpe.
Just as a cumulative i n k in
a m adds to tensions, a gradual, balanced Limitation of military capacity should further mitigate distrust and help prepre the way for a long-term ddtentc.

RecrsJlr CBmrg%#

Witbin the past few monk, at bast o m area has been
taken out of the armnar race. On 1 Decemk 1959, twelve
nations having claim or an interest in Antarctica ;rp;retd to
demilitarize &at icy con tin en^ The meaty pxoh~%im ""any
measures d a milimy nature, such as the e s t a b W a t d
military imes and fortidimtiom, she canyhg out cd military
maneuvers, as well as the testing of any type of weapms'"
the An&rctic.H A sysfmi of inspection is provided for that
permits each government to designate impmom and requires all ~v-epts
to a
d the inspectors "mmplete
freedom of a m at m y time to any or all area of Antarcti=" Each nation mmt provide the others with a timetable
of pknned movements af expeditions and ships and with
lists of military personnel, equipment, and trases in operation Agreement on this quite com+ensive
treaty wadi
facilitated by Antaraids relative animpnance as a base

for military opcratk6W
Outer space* only now being opened up to exploratioln,
p a considerably grea@r problems becatwe it is the region
through which &ik&aail, Furthermore, even instruments
of p&a$d purpose (em&, weather-prediction meUitej)
could be used £or military intelwae. Over the p
t year
the Committee on S p e Research (COSPAR) of the International Camcil of Scientific Unions (a non-governmental
body) has- been seeking W e t m o p t i o n in developing
coodinad r
d programs. Although Soviet scientists
joined GOSPAR they threatened not to cooperate because
the? Eelt they were under-rep~aented.In January agreement
WText
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announced that k t and West would have parity in
GOSPAR'S seven-man inner cabinet (the president is to be
a neutral). The voting procedure, in effect, gives either side
a veto on all important decisions taken by COSPAR. Another compromise has end& the Soviet boycott of the United
Nations Committee on the Peaceful U s e of Outer Space,
whir11 the USSR felt was dominated by Weatern powem.
Under a new membership formula agreed to in December,
the original membership of eighteen, twelve of whom were
allied to the West in one way or another,
expanded to
twenty-four, with t~relvefrom the West, seven from the Eat.
and five neutrals.
These recent c h m p in the composition of the outerspace committees, along with the unanimous-voting procedure in the Geneva rcnference and parity of membership in
thc new ten-nation t5hmament committee, mark the increasing success of Soviet e&orts to achieve equality with the
West in transactions related to disarmament. To the extent
that the changes encourage or pennit Soviet participation
in negotiations, they constitute an advance. However, this is
not to say that a suaessfuI conclusion to the negotiations is
thereby ensured or even made more probabIe.
A new role for the United Nations is foreshadowed by
recent developments. Unlike the previous period of active
negotiations, the forthcoming talks will nor be held under
its direct auspices. For the time being, at least, the United
Nations is less likely to be the source of a disarmament plan
than to be the ratifla of a possible agreement, to enmurage,
prod, or modify, but nos to create. In the Iong nm,this may
pro.rfeto be a more realistic role far the OI.ganization.
This trend was highlighted by the fourteenth Assembly's
activity on the subject of disarmament. T h e Awmbly. in
spite of its inability to serve as the broker for a disarmament
transaction, lias become a powerful stimulant to action, be
it propaganda or a serious probing for agreement. The tone
of these debates indicates great-power awarenw that the
current arms race concerns many more than those immedi;~teIyinvolved. It indicates an acceptance by the great pwms
was

of their rlespomibility to take steps to curb the race orsfailing that, to account EI) the United Nations for their Inability
ta & sc. No anr has seriously &alIenged the assertion of
tke b e t a r y - 6 e n d last summer that dbrmment "'i9 one
of thw quatiom of which the General Assembly should
always be s e i 2 d " ' d s
Given the instability and rigb of reliance: on mutual nudear deterrence, the question remains whether the extrrnaI

I

p'esru~esof world opinion and the internal pressures of an
~ a s h g l by ~ ~ arms
m racee are ruQcient to awe real
pmgmm on general arms limimrion and conuol, m whether
tbe ferment of 1960 will simply turn out ta have provided
new h m s fm East-wessd i g a ~ e n t .
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inmiheService of Peace With Justice
fifty years have passed since the Camegis Endowment for International Peaca was eflabliied by
Andrew Carnegie to "haden the abolition

of infer-

national war.'To observe this impartan) anniversary,

the Endowment i~
undshking m extensive y e a r h g
program, "Pempec)ives on Pasce,'"lo stimulate condrudive thinking on the problems invdved in working
for an enduring peace founded on freedam and justi-. Eminen* ststemen and mspondble ti+izens here
and abroad have been invited fo draw on M r rpecia1 experience for insigh

may be applied today

and tomorrow. fdsus will be rough+ as +o specific
measures .)hat mighf be adopted by +he Unifed S.)ates
and o+her govemmsnts. &r) +he $may coneern will
be a m-mvahdion of ttw ns+ure, uruxes, and condi+ions of world peace in fhe nuclear age.
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